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The parpose of this thesis is to suggest the location of a pos
sible permanent boundary line for Israel, The boundary which will
be used as a basis to work from is the 19^9 cease fire line (same
as pre-1967 War boundary), since this is the boundary that Israel
wants to have adjusted and the one that the Arab nations demand
that Israel return to. The major portion of the thesis is devoted
to determining: what changes in the pre-1967 War boundary are con
sidered most necessary by Israel and are most acceptable to the
Arabs, The identification of chanjces considered most necesssiry
by Israel consists of a three sta^e process. In the first staj^e,
areas of historical/reliprious sijo^nificance, economic importance,
and military (strategic) sisrnificance for Israel in the occupied
territories are analyzed. The second stai^e is an assessment of
the inte(?ration and consolidation actions taken by Israel in the
occupied territories. The third sta^e of the Identification
process consists of an analysis of public statements by the
Israeli government concemin^c permanent boundaries for Israel,
The approach outlined above represents an attempt to arrive at
an accurate assessment of which areas in the occupied territories
are of major sip:nificance to Israel and which are of less
importance. The countering?: Arab position concerning the boundary
of Israel is determined from statements by Arab heads of state and
Palestine Liberation Orp:anization leaders.
The major hypothesis of the thesis is that the conflict arising
from Israel's demand for secure and permanent borders, the
Palestinian demand for a state of their own, and the demand of
Israel's bordering Arab states for return of occupied territory
can be reconciled.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arab nations is
an unusually complex problem which includes relif^ious animosity, dis
puted territory and suppressed nationalism amon^^ its major issues, but
the key to any successful settlement of the conflict lies in reachin^^
an agreement over the location of a permanent boundary for Israel,
This concentration upon the Israeli boundary issue addresses both the
major Arab demand for return of the territory occupied by Israel since
1967 and the primary Israeli demand for "secure and recognized" borders.
It also confronts indirectly the question of Palestinian self determin
ation through resolution of the boundary question along the Gaza Strip
and West Bank territories. Finally, the resolution of the boundary
issue provides a means of dissipating the intensity of the Arab com
mitment to a Jihad, or "holy war" e^^ainst Israel, a war that the Arabs
have vowed to continue until Israel is destroyed.
Since the Arab commitment to the Jihad stems from a deep seated
resentment against Jewish intrusion into the Arab Middle East, the mere
initialing of an agreement with Israel is not going to terminate the
Arab desire to be rid of the Israeli presence in the Middle East,
What a boundauty settlement can do, though, is provide an opportunity
for the more moderate Arab nations to subordinate their commitment
regarding the "holy war" against Israel to an emphasis upon furthering
1
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their own national interests. If only a few of the more powerful
Arab nations can be persuaded to forgo the united Arab cause against
Israel and turn their efforts to social and economic advancements
within their own country, the Arab opposition would be too weak to
threaten seriously Israel's existence, which is about the most security
that Israel can ever hope to have in the Arab Middle East,
The purpose of this thesis, then, is to suggest the location of
a possible permanent boundary line for Israel,

The boundary which

will be used as a basis from which to work is the 19^9 cease fire line
(same as the pre-1967 War boundary), since this is the boundary that
Israel wants to have adjusted and the one to which the Arab nations
demand that Israel return.

The major portion of this thesis is de

voted to determining what changes in this boundary sure considered most
necessary by Israel and are most acceptable to the Arabs.

The iden

tification of chajiges considered most necessary by Israel consists of
a three-steige process.

In the first stage areas of historical/

religious significance, economic importance, and militsay (strategic)
significance for Israel in the occupied territories axe determined.
The second stage is an assessment of the integration and consolidation
actions taken by Israel in the occupied territories.

The third stage

of the identification process consists of an analysis of public state
ments by the Israeli government concerning permanent boundaries for
Israel,

This three sta^e approach should result in an accurate

assessment of which areas in the occupied territories are of major
significance to Israel and which are of less importance.

The counter

ing Arab position concerning the boundary of Israel is determined from
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statements "by Arab heads of state and Palestine Liberation Organ
ization (PLO) leaders.
The major hypothesis of this thesis is that the conflict emong
Israel's demand for a secure and permanent boundary, the Palestinian's
demand for a state of their own, and the demand of Israel's boajdering
Arab states for return of the occupied territory can be reconciled.
This reconciliation of conflicting demands is not an easy task. The
settlement terms proposed in this thesis axe not guaranteed to satisfy
completely all parties involvcsd in the dispute, and, in fact, require
far greater compromise on the part of some of the parties than they
have been willing to make in the past.

Yet, all of the compromises

involved merely ask a party to forgo a sfiecific demand in the in
terest of achieving its overall objective. This is the heart of the
arguement behind the boundary proposal offered in this thesisj
the assertion that the parties involved are unlikely to gain all of the
specifics of their demands, but that it is quite possible for them to
gain the substance of their demajids provided they are willing to re
structure their proposals along lines that are more attractive to the
opposition.

What this means is that Israel can gain secure borders,

but it is unlikely that it can gain the territory which it considers
necessary for secure borders; that the Palestinians cem achieve a
state of their own, though it will not be gained under the exact terms
that the Palestinians desire; and that the bordering Arab nations can
regain a considerable portion of their lost territory, though it is
unlikely that they will be able to deploy military forces as freely
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as they would like in these territories. Since the terms offered
in this thesis axe hypothetical, it can not be proven that either
Israel or the Arab nations (and people, i.e. Palestinians) would be
willing to make these kinds of compromises. What can, sind will, be
demonstrated, though, is that the terms proposed are very close to
the maximum concessions any one peirty can expect to gain and still
have all parties agree to the proposals.
Of course, the border issue is not going to be resolved merely
by drawing a line on a map and calling it Israel's boundary.

The

overall settlement will require a complex arrangement of demilita
rized zones, force limitations, economic arrangements between Israel
and the new Palestinian state, and a host of other minor details to
resolve problems which axise due to circumstances peculigir to a par
ticular territory. These issues are peripheral to the central concern
of this thesis, but will be dealt with in the course of the discussion
concerning final settlement proposals.
As a final note, in an effort to avoid redundaJicy, vaxioua terms
are used during the course of the essay to refer to the same event or
area. Thus, the Arab-Israeli war which occurred between June 5» 196?,
BJid June 11, 1967, is refeirred to variously as the 196? Wax, the Six
Day War or the June Wax,

The Arab-Israeli war which took place in

1948 and 19^9 is referred to as Israel's War of Independence, while
the terms Yom Kipper War, October War and 1973

used to refer

to the Arab-Israeli war of October 7, 1973"'October 24, 1973.

The term

"Israel proper" refers to the state of Israel as defined by the 1949

5

cease fire line, while the term "Jordan proper" refers to that portion
of Jordan which lies east of the Jordan River,

The unified city of

Jerusalem is referred to simply as "Jerusalem," The portion of that
city controlled by Israel before the 196? War is termed "West Jerusalem"
while the portion controlled by Jordan prior to the 196? War is termed
"East Jerusalem,"

CHAPTER II
IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT AREAS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Areas of Historical/Religious Significance
The discussion of the historical borders of Israel is divided
into two distinct periods.

The first period covers the historical

boundaries of the areas controlled by Israelite tribes during: bib
lical timest while the second covers the develojaient of the Jewish
state in Palestine from its beprinninsrs with the Zionist movement of
the I880's until its culmination in the state of Israel as defined
by the 19^9 cease fire lines.

Since the very existence of the state

of Israel stems from unique relisjious and historical claims upon the
land of Palestine, one might expect that historical boundaries would
be a signfiicant factor in determining ultimate Israeli borders. Such
is not really the case, though, because historical boundaries of Israel
have varied so extensively that everyone from the most rabid Israeli
expansionist to the most militant Palestinian could find ample his
torical justification for whatever boundaries he believed should
encompass the state of Israel.

The purpose of the discussion, then,

is (l) to point out the problems created by an emphasis upon historical
boundaries, (2) determine those parts of the occupied territories to
which Israel possesses the strongest (and the weakest) historical
claims, and (3) provide enough background information about the

6
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formation of the modem state of Israel for the reader to pain a
basic understanding: of the historical roots of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Ancient
On the following pa^es are a succession of maps which give a
rather clear picture of the wide flux of the boundaries of the ancient
Kin^om of Israel.

Althoujrh the tribes of Israel entered the area

of modem-day Israel around 1200 b,c,, it was not until Saul assumed
control of the tribes in 1020 b.c., that the Israelites were able to
establish any firm political control over the territory,^

As the map

on page 8 indicates, Saul's kingdom was a little smaller than modemday Israel (as defined by the 19^9 cease fire lines), though Saul's
domain included extensive areas of present-day Jordan,

Saul died in

1000 b,c, and he was replaced by David, who made massive additions to
the Israelite kingdom (see the insert map on page 9).

Although the

southern boundary of David's territory roughly parallels the southem
boundary of Israel proper, the northern empire included portions of
modem-day Lebanon, well over half of modem-day Syria and most of
the western half of Jordan.

David's son, Solomon, took over the

kingdom in 960 b.c,, and though he did not expand upon David's territory,
he did consolidate and greatly strengthen Israelite control over this
territory through effective political and economic orgjinization,2

^Efraim Orni and Elisha Bfrat, Geopraphv of Israel. 3d ed,,
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Prens, 19?3)» P. 202.
^Ibid.. p. 205.
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The harsh taxes and forced labor imposed by Solomon created
considerable dissension in the Israelite kingdom and led to Jeroboan*s
3
revolt with the death of Solomon in 930 b.c.

This revolution split

up the Israelite empire into the Kingdom of Judah in the south under
the rule of Rehoboaji and the Kingdom of Israel in the north under
Jeroboaim,

The division of the kingdom led to the temporary loss of

most of David and Solomon's northern empire by 880 b.c, (see map on
page iO), though some 100 years later Jeroboam II (793~752 b.c.) once
again pushed the northern boundary of the Kingdom of Israel back to
the Euphrates River. Following this brief revival of Israelite power,
both the Israelite kingdoms began a gradual decline until they were
completely destroyed with the destruction of the Jerusalem temple by
Nebuchanezzar in 586 b.c. The Israelites remained a subjugated people
under various rulers until the Macreobean revolt against the Greek
rulers in 16? b,c, resulted in the Israelites once again becoming an
independent people.

Initially, the Israelites controlled only a

small area in the imediate vicinity of Jerusalem, but successive
Israelite rulers gradually enlsarged the kingdom until the conquests
of Alexander Jannaeus (IO7-79 b,c,) expanded the kingdom over an area
slightly larger than that encompassed by the divided kingdom in 880 b.c.
(see map on page 11).

Following the death of Jannaeus, the Israelite

kingdom again declined until it ceased to exist with the Roman occu
pation of the area in 63 b.c.
^Ibid.
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This very brief review of the historical bordeirs of Israel
during biblical times can only lead one to conclude that ancient his
torical claims do not offer a very profitable approach for resolving?
the boundary question of modem day Israel,

In the first place, the

territorial limits controlled by the Israelites fluxuated so widely
that the term "historical boundaries" could apply to an area much
smaller than modem-day Israel, or it could apply equally to an area
encompassing all of Palestine and a sizeable chunk of Syria, Lebanon
and Jordan as well,

A second problem is the fact that some of

Israel's strongest historical claims lie in territories in which most
Israelis express little interest in.

The inaps clearly demonstrate

that the Israelites controlled most of western Jordan throughout
the existence of the kingdom, yet no Israeli government has expressed
interest in retaining territory east of the Jordan River and Dead
ItSea.

A third complication is the fact that, at one time or another,

the boundary of the Israelite kingdom encompassed virtually all of the
cuarrently occupied territories except the Sinai.

In nost instances,

though, this control tended to be of short duration.

The Israelites

controlled the Golan Heights only during the reign of Solomon and
David and for a brief period under Alexander Jannaeus,

Most of the

time the Israelite kingdom did not encompass any of the Gaza Strip,
though David and Solomon manaiged to control briefly the lower half of
the area, and Alexander Jauinaeus extended Israelite control over most
ll

Return of the "lost" Transjordan area had been a goal of Prime
Minister Begin's Likud Party (see Leonard J, Fein, Israeli Politics
and People. (Bostoni Little, Brown & Company, 1968), p. 118), but
the position has been dropped since Begin assumped office.

of this territory as well as a siaall strip of the Sinai territory along
the Medlterranesui coastline.

This final conquest of Jannaeus marked

the only extension of the Israelite kingdom into Sinai territory. The
Israelite control over the West Bank area (and Jerusalem), though,
remained constant throughout the kingdom's existence. This gives
Israel strong historical ties to the West Bemk territory and Jerusalem,
"but the modem-day West Bank territory is so heavily populated with
Palestinian Arabs, that only the Likud government of Menachem Begin
has made the area a primary consideration for retention of Israeli
control. Prime Minister Begin's policy does represent a true departure,
for he has always placed historical considerations ahead of security
considerations, which is the reverse of traditional Israeli policy.
His primary concern has "been with regaining Israeli control over the
biblical areas of Judea and Samaria (see page 11), which is the presentday West Bamk teanritory.

All of the Israeli governments have been

determined to retain control over Jerusalem, so historical ties are
always invoked as one of the primary justifications for this Israeli
action.

Recent
From the time of Pompey's occupation of the Israelite kingdom in

63 b,c, until the early 20th century, Jews held no political control
over any of the Palestinian territory. During this long period of
subjugation, the Jewish population in Palestine slowly dwindled until
the onset of the Zionist movement in the l880's caused a revival of

15

Jewish immigration into Palestine,

The Zionists called for the estab

lishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,

To accomplish this end,

they undertook extensive efforts to convince Jews to return to the
"lost homeland" and also attempted to negotiate a deal with Turkey to
transfer political control of the area into Jewish hands,^

The Zionists'

efforts resulted in a large increase of Jewish immigrajits into
Palestine, but their efforts to gain political control of the territory
from Turkey, through purchase or other means, were unsuccessful. With
the outbreak of World Max I, the Allied powers worked on plans to
break up the Turkish Empire following a successful conclusion of the
war.

The World Zionist Organization was aware of the Allied Interest

in dismantling the Turkish Empire, so heavy pressure was brought to
bear upon the British government to sponsor the creation of a Jewish
state in Palestine once the land had been "liberated" from Turkey,^
The World Zionist Organization succeeded partially in their lobbying
effort, though the ultimate result of their success was the creation
of the Middle East problem which still pla^fues that area today.
The basic problem concerning the creation of a Jewish state in
Israel was the fact that the vast majority of Palestine's residents
were Arab,

If the British were to propose that Palestine be turned

into a Jewish state, contrary to the wishes of the Arab majority in
Palestine, then Britain would appear to be abandoning its belief in

^Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diarv. 2 vols,
(Beiiruti Palestine Research Center, 1970), 1» p. B,
^IMd, pp. 59-7^.
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democratic principles.

Yet the World Zionist Organization exerted far

more influence in British i)olitics than the Palestinian Arabs did, so
the British had to come up with a solution which would resolve their
dilemma.

The Balfour Declaration (the basic legal document authorizing

Israel's existence) was designed to do just that. It readsi
His Majesty's Government view with favour the estab
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, auid will use their best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in amy other country,7
Thus the term "national home" was sufficiently va^ue to allow the
British to assure the World Zionist Organization that the "national
homeland" would become, eventually, the Jewish state of Israel, while
at the same time explaining to the Palestinian Arabs that the term
"national homeland" meant simply that Jews could emigrate to the land
of their historical roots, but not take over political control in
Palestine.

While this approach did get the British off the hook

temporarily, it created a situation which Biade it virtually impos
sible for Britain to resolve the issue of who would gain political
control over Palestine,

The problems which resulted from British

vacillation are discussed later on in this section of Chapter II,
The Balfour Declaration raised the issue of Palestine's boundaries.
Since Palestine did not have any definite boundaries during the period
of Turkish control (in fact, Palestine did not really exist during this
"^John Norton Moore, ed.. The Arab-Israel Conflict. 3 vols.
(Princeton, New Jersey« Princeton University Press, 197^), 3« P. 32.
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period), the participants at the Versaille Peace Conference of 1918
had to set aside am area to constitute the "Jewish homeland." The
World Zionist Orgamization was asked by conference participants to
submit a proposal for boundaries of this area.
World Zionist Orp:anization is shown on page 19.

The request of the
It should be noted

that these proposals placed far more emphasis upon geopolitical
considerations than historical ones.

They represented a deliberate

attempt to include in the Jewish state as much of the water resources,
fertile soil gind natural barriers in this area of the Middle East as
possible.

The Versaille Conference participants regarded these proQ
posals as excessive, so the Palestine question was tabled until the
San Remo Conference of 1920,

At this conference, British, French and

Italian representatives met to resolve final differences in setting
up mandated territories in the Middle East.

Once again the Zionists

offered their Versaille proposal for Palestine's boundaries, but Lloyd
George, the British representative, concluded that the historical
boundaries of Palestine had never exceeded Dan in the north and
Beersheba in the south,^

As a practical gesture, the French and

British representatives decided to extend the sourhem boundary of
Palestine to the tip of the Gulf of Aquaba, so that the Palestine
territory would be assured of a southern port.

While the rough

boundaries of Palestine were j^^reed upon at this conference, the final
®John and Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, p. 1^3.
^Ibid.. p, 125,
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location of boundary lines was left to later deliberations between
France and Great Britain.
At the San Remo Conference the three powers did decide that Syria
would be under a French mandate while Great Britain would have the
mandate over Palestine. When the mandate charter for Palestine was
approved by the League of Nations in April of 1922, the territory of
Transjordaji was also included as a part of Palestine. However, Article
25 of the mandate charter gave the British the right (with the consent
of the Council of the League of Nations) to withhold application of
the Balfour Declaration provisions from the area east of the Jordan
R i v e r , I n September of 1922 the British, with the approval of the
League's Council, created the separate territory of Transjordan euid
set the western boundaries of Palestine ati
...a line drawn 2 miles
Gulf of that name up to
and River Jordan to its
thence up the center of

west of the town of Aquaba on the
the center of Wadi Araba, Dead Sea
junction with the River Yaruk,
the river to the Syrian frontier,

In 1923 the final border auijustments were made by giving Palestine a
small finger of lajid along the woutheastem shore of the Sea of
Galilee, a narrow extension of territory along PauLestine'e north
west comer and a very small chunk of territory along Palestine's
northerxmost point.

In retuim, a small triangle of the Golan area

was given to the Syrian mandate (see insert nap, page 19).

lOpor the complete text of Article 25, see Moore, The ArabIsrael Conflict. 3« P» 83#
^^Ibid.
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The Zionists, of course, were upset with the loss of TransJordan

12 "but subsequent British policy threatened

from the Jewish homeland,

the Jews with the loss of all Palestine, Since the British govern
ment had never fully committed itself to the Zionist interpretation
of the Jewish homeland in Palestine (i.e., creation of a Jewish state),
the Zionists became impatient with the lack of progress in tiransforming
Palestine into a Jewish state. Whenever the Zionists increased pres
sure upon the British, though, the British would respond to the
Zionists* demands by taking small steps (e,g,, increased integration
of Jews, a larger Jewish voice in administration of the territory) in
the direction of the Zionists* demands.

These actions, in turn, would

upset the Palestinian Arabs and ineviatably lead to Arab riots in
Palestine.

The British would then react to placate the Palestinian

Arabs, usually through retracting or reducing the gains advanced to
the Jews.

This would cause the Zionists to increase political pres

sure upon the British government, gain new concessions from the British,
n
and start the same vicious cycle all over sigain.

This British policy

of continually avoiding the issue, of continually making and breaking
promises to both sides, created such a climate of hostility between
Arabs and Jews, and between both groups and the British government, that
the British found the teirritory virtually impossible to goveiTi by the
^^Chaim Weizmann, hesid of the World Zionist Organization during
the 1920's £ind 30*s, discusses the problems he faced in preserving
Zionist unity following the loss of the Transjordan axea in his
autobiography, Trial and Error» The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann.
(New York I Harper aind Brothers, 19^9)» pp. 290-292.
13
•^-'For an in-depth discussion of this situation see John amd
Hadawi, The Palestine Diary. Chapters 10-16,

late 1940's. Thus the British f^ratefully turned the problem over to
the United Nations in 194?.

The United Nations solution was the

partition plan of November 194? (see map, page 20), which was accepted
reluctantly by the Jews but refused by the Palestinian Arabs.

The

result was the 19^8-49 war between Jews and Palestinian Arabs (who
were supported by nei<?hboring Arab states). The Jewish forces won
the conflict and established the state of Israel within the uneasy
confines of the 1949 cease fire line.
About the only conclusion one can draw from the foregoing dis
cussion of Israel's coming into being is that the question of Israel's
historical boundeuries remains as difficult to resolve now as it did
following the discussion of Israel's biblical boundaries. The major
problem is the fact that Palestine was a created state, that its
boundaxies were imposed from outside and modified at the whim of
those nations doing the imjwsing.

The United Nations effort to create

boundaries for Israel is a further exeunple of this same situation.
This process was reversed with the War of Independence in 1948, but
the introduction of military strength as the determining factor did
not resolve the boundary question satisfactorily. Since both the
Arabs and the Jews possessed little military strength at the time of
the War of Independence, they had to concentrate their forces on areas
of major importance and simply hope for the best in the rest of Palestine,
The result was a divided Jerusalem with two large groupings of Arabs

^^See Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, 0*Jerusalem!.
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), for an account of Israel's
extensive concentration upon Jerusalem objectives during the War of
Independence,
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situated in opposite sides of Palestine and the Jews concentrated in
the center.

It is not a good idea to let strength be the determining

factor in the settlement of the boundeury issue, because the current
balance of strength in the Middle East has left Israel with far more
territory tl-ian it needs or even wants, but with no more hope of re
solving the boundary problem than has existed in the past.

It appeaurs

that the best means of dealing with historical factors in any boundary
resolution is to take historical considerations into account in areas
of acute Jewish religious Interest (i.e., Jerusalem and the West Bank
territory) while downplaying historical claims in other areas.

Any

Israeli historical claims to the Sinai, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights
are so ajnbiguous as to be almost meaningless.

Areas of Economic Significance
Although certain portions of the occupied territories offer
economic attractions to Israel, the economic attractiveness alone is
not going to be sufficient reason for Israel to seek annexation of a
particular portion of the occupied territory, because economic ex
ploitation would be viewed as a totally unacceptable justification
for any territorial expansion by Israel, even by Israel's few friends,
Israel's return of the Abu Rudeis oilfields in the Sinai in 197^ appears
to be a clear cut rejection of territorial retention purely for economic
gain.

These oilfields were by far the most valuable piece of property^^

in all of the occupied territories.

They supplied Israel between

75~85,000 barrels of oil a day, which was close to 60 percent of the

^^This information concerning production of the Abu Rudeis
oilfields comes from the New York Times. 13 JaJiuary 1975» P.

Zk

country's needs in 197^» and provided Israel with 250 million dollars
worth of production. Since the Israeli's domestic production of oil
(without Abu Rudeis) is less than 5 percent of internal consumption,
the return of these oil fields to %ypt was of considerable economic
consequence to Israel,

Yet the Rabin government gave up these oil

fields in the early stajs^es of the 197^ negotiations with Egypt simply
because retention of this area some 200 miles from Israel proper
could not be reconciled with Israel's publicly stated policy of only
desiring "secure and recognized" borders. If the Israeli government
wants to retain the economic benefits of any portion of an occupied
territory, then, it will have to find areas of economic attractiveness
which cam be requested for inclusion within Israel under some more
acceptable justification. It is interesting to note, though, that
most of the other areas of economic potential in the occupied ter
ritories are located in places which can be claimed as being strate
gically significant for the defense of Israel,

Sinai
Although none of the other areais of economic potential in the
occupied territories begin to approach the value of Abu Rudeis, there
are a few areas of economic attractiveness. In the Sinai the major
economic attraction is oil.

Exhaustive geological suarveys, which have

been made in both Israel auid the occupied territories, indicate the
most promising areas for finding oil are a 12 mile wide swath of the
Mediterranean Sea running from Israel's Lebanon border south to El
Arish in the Sinai, and in an axea. beginning just south of the Abu
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Rudeis oil fields and running to the Sinai's southern tip. Some
^eologists also believe that a good possibility for aajor oil deposits

il

exists along the Sinai's Mediterranean coastline between Barwadi Lagoon
and El Arish,

The Israeli government has constructed a seismic study

site just off the El Arish coastline, another at Beowadi Lagoon, and
a third just south of El Arish,

Test drilling sites have been set up

at El Tur (just south of Abu Rudeis) and in an area a few miles south
of the El Arish seismic test station,The Israeli government also
has announced plans for carrying out exploration drilling in waters
near Shaunn el Sheihk and Ras Muhammed at the Sinai's southern tip,^"^
Since the Sharm el Sheihk area is one of major strategic sig
nificance to Israel, one cam anticipate the possibility that Israel
will seek retention of this area of the Sinai under national security
claims, while quietly exploiting it economically.

The Israeli actions

in the vicinity of El Arish appear to be another example of this same
strategy.

Along with its potential as ein oil producing region, the

El Arish "Triangle"^® is the only area of the Sinai possessing any
agricultural value. The Israeli's oil exploiation actions along
with their efforts to develop agriculture in the area (described in
Chapter III) indicate a strong Israeli interest in suinexing this
^%ew York Times. 24 November 19751 P. 2,
^"^New York Times. 13 January 1975, P. 12.
18

The El Arish Trieingle refers to the area between El Arish and
the old Geiza-Strip-Egyptian boirder (pre-1967 War) to a point some 30
miles inland from the Mediterranean Sea along the pre-1967 War EgyptIsrael border. This axea is also known as the Rafiah Salient,
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portion of the Sinai,

Although it would be much more difficult for

Israel to seek annexation of the area between El Arish and BarwaxJi
Lacroon and the area around El Tur on the Suez Gulf coast, if the
Sinai dispute were resolved with a step-by-step approach drawn out
over a ^ or 5 year period, it would allow Israel time to drain off
as much oil as possible from any successful exploration efforts in
these two areas.

The current impasse in ne^rotiations works in Israel's

favor economically in this area because it p:ives Israel time to com
plete its explorations of the Sinai and determine which areas will
yield the most oil.

There is no evidence, though, which indicates

that Israel is deliberately stallinsr neprotiations in order to profit
economically,

Gaza Strip/Kest_Bank
Both the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories possess little
economic potential for Israel,

Probably the only economic attraction

of suiy importance in either territory is the oil potential just off
the Gaza Strip coast.

Other than the oil potential, Israel would

jrain little economic advantage from annexin^r either territory, in part
or in its entirity.

Due to the extensive Arab settlement in both

territories, virtually all of the cultivable land is already bein^i:
farmed by Arabs,

Neither territory possesses any significant mineral

deposits other tham the oil potential off the Gaza coast, so the only
economic asset of these territories is a large work force,

Israel

does not need to annex these territories in order to take advantage
of the available workers (this is discussed in Chapter III), and
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sriven the prolonjred economic slump in Israel in the last few years,
the Israeli economy no lonf!;er needs an abundant labor force,

Golan Heiffhts
The entire Golan Heights is of some economic si^^nificance to
Israel due to its potential for ae:ricultural production.

Since all

of the inhabitants of the territory (except some 5fOOO Druze farmers
living in the northeastern comer of the territory) fled durin;^ the
1967 War,^^ Israel was left with some 4^00 square miles of moderate to
cood a^^ricultural land.

The area shows excellent potential for

raising wheat, cotton and some veeretables, but its primary economic
attraction to Israel stems from its potential for beef production.
Since Israel is a very small, heavily populated nation, the country
cajinot afford to use its precious as;ricultural land for cattle
production. Consequently, Israel spent extensive sums of money on
OA
meat imports (16 million in 1967)
prior to the Six Day War, A

1968 firovemment survey of the Hei^rhts estimated that sufficient
natural pastures existed in the Heights to support the grazing of

30,000 head of cattle,^^

This still left quite a bit of cultivable

land in the territory, which has been utilized for producing wheat,
cotton and vegetables,

^^Eliyahu Kanovsky, The Economic Imract of the Six Dav War.
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 185,
^^Ibid.. p, 198,
^^Ibid.. p. 200,
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Areas of Strategic Significance

From the time that Israel first gained control of the occupied
territories in June of 196?, all the Israeli governments have in
sisted adamantly that Israel will not return to the pre-war boundaries,
and that adjustments in the 196? boundaries would have to be mside so
that Israel would i)ossess "secure and recognized" boundaries. This
position of the Israeli governments leads one to conclude that the
most important territories or portions of territories are those with
the most strategic value for the defense of Israel,
22

conclusion is not always valid,

Although this

the Israeli governments, in general,

have demonstrated a much greater willingness to compromise over areas
of major economic or religious significance than they have concerning
areais of major strategic value. Consequently, all of the areas of
major strategic significance in the occupied territories must be viewed
as prime candidates for amnexation or for inclusion within ssones of
Israeli military control.

The only exception to this rule occurs in

certain instances where annexation of a strategically significant
area would require the inclusion of vast areas of limited strategic
value.

In these situations the Israeli governments have demonstrated

a willingness to relenquish their hold on the axea as long as no Arab
opponent regains the strategic value of the position,
22The occupied territory which all Israeli governments have placed
the most importance upon is E^t Jerusalem, which is of limited stra
tegic value (this is discussed later in this chapter) but of immense
historical and religious value. Also, in the West Bank territory,
the Begin government has made religious considerations more important
than strategic considerations in determining the areas in which his
government is most interested in retaining an Israeli presence.
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Sinai
A prime example of this latter approach is seen in the Israeli's
withdrawal from the strategic passes in the Sinai,

There are four

strategically significant passes in the Sinai; Mitla» Gidi, Wadi Ras
Sur and Wadi Garadal,

The former two axe the most important for Israel,

since they hold the key to defense of the entire Sinai,

An Israeli

P'eneral estimated that am Israeli force solidly entrenched in these
23
two passes could hold off an E^ptian force seven times larger.
They are also of major strategic significauice because these passes
guard the most desirable invasion route between Egypt and Israel,

Most

of the Sinai south of these passes is a mass of virtually inpenetrable
mountains, while the flat coastline north of the passes is dominated
by shifting saind dunes which cannot be traversed by military vehicles.
Thus any Egyptian invasion force moving along this area would be con
fined to the one northern Sinai highway, making it an easy target for
Israeli planes.

An Egyptian force which made its way through Mitla

and Cidi passes, though, would have relatively flat, easily travers
able terrain all the way to Israel proper.

The Rabin government

agreed to withdraw from these passes as port of the second EgyptIsrael Sinai Withdrawal Accord of 1975t but the passes were not turned
over to Egyptiem forces.

Under the terms of the agreement, the passes

were occupied by American observers and United Nations forces, thus
insuring that the strategic advantage of the Sinai passes would not
be held by either side.

One can anticipate that, in the event of a

^%ew York Times, 12 February 1975, P* 3»
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final E^ptisui-Israeli peace agreement in the Sinai, that Israel will
insist upon no Egyptian military forces or fortifications in these
passes.
There is one other area of major strategic sijsrnificance to
Israel in the Sinai, alon^^ with several other areas of lesser stra
tegic importance,

Israel's major strategic concern in this territory

is the Straits of Tiran located at the southern tip of the Sinai (Sharm
el Sheihk). Israel is vitally concerned about this area because the
military force which controls the Sharm el Sheihk axea controls access
through the Straits of Tiran to Israel's southern port of Eilat.

The

only deep water shipping channel through the Straits of Tiran is a veiry
narrow corridor (800-1,000 yards wide) which runs along the western
side of the Saudia Arabian island of Tiran, some four miles from the
Sinai coastline. The shipping lajie is too narrow to allow much
maneuverability, so the ships passing through this channel are at the
mercy of guns positioned along the Sinai coastline. If this channel
is closed, Israel is limited to their two Mediterranean ports. Such
a development would create considerable transportation problems within
Israel, it would close down the oil pipeline from Eilat to Ashkalon,
ajid it would deal a severe psychological blow to the Israeli's con
viction that they can defend their country against Arab aggressiveness.
The fact that both the 1956 auid 196? Israeli suprise attacks against
Egyptian forces immediately followed an Egyptian blockade of the Straits
of Tiran points out just how much strategic significance is attached
to this area by Israel,
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There are three other areas alonsr the pre-1967 War EcyptIsrael boundary that are of some stratesric si^mificance to Israel,
though of considerably less importance than Sharm el Sheihk,

The

Israeli's are concerned about the vulnerability of Eilat, located at
the tip of the Gulf of Aquaba.

The pre-1967 Wsir boundary intersected

the Gulf of Aquaba only a few miles south of Eilat.

Consequently, it

would require only a very short advamcement for an E^ryptian force
to capture Eilat and cut off Israeli access to the Red Sea.

Several

Israeli ffovemments have expressed am interest in providing a ten to
fifteen mile wide cushion between Eilat and the Egyptian border in
the area.

A second axea. of Israeli strategic interest is the northern

most part of the Sinai along the Mediterranean coast.

This area would

provide an Egyptian force the quickest access to the heavily populated
regions of Israel, so the Israelis* have expressed interest in extend
ing Israel's pre-i967 War boundary to include some of this territoiy.
Given the extensive Israeli settlement efforts in this area since
1975 (discussed in Chapter III), one can expect the Israeli govern
ment to place increasing emphasis upon the strategic significance of
this area. A third location that is considered of strategic signif
icance is the crossroads areas between Eilat auid El Arish,

The first

of these is the Abu Aweigila-Kusseima region, while the second is
near Kuntilla, north of Eilat.

The Rabin government wanted to retain

^^Yigal Allon expressed the Rabin government's interest in this
area (Yigal Allon, "Israeli The Case for Defensible Borders,"
Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976)* 48-49.), and implied that Israel
should retain control of a ten to fifteen mile wide strip of the Sinai
runninsr from the MediteirraJiean to the Gulf of Aquaba.
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Israeli control of these crossroads areas because they form the inter
section points on the main land routes from the Sinai to Beersheba
and Eilat.

Although the strategic areas in this portion of the Sinai

are located quite some distance from each other, the easiest means for
Israel to resolve its security problems alon<^ the Sinai frontier is to
extend its southern boundary ten to fifteen miles into the Sinai. The
Rabin srovemment au3opted this approach, and the Be^in government has
taken the same position, thouffh it advocates extension of Israeli
military control into the area. throu^?h the creation of a security
25
corridor rather than annexation of territory.
There is one other important security consideration for Israel
in the Sinai. Since there jure only four major military airfields
within Israel proper, the country is extremely vulnerable to a sur
prise attack.

Durinp^ the occupation of the Sinai, Israel constructed

four airfields in the territory, Bir Gifffaufa near the Gidi and Mitla
passes, Ofira near Sharm el Sheihk, Eitam neair El Arish, and Etzion
near Eilat (see map, pa^re

57),

The Begin government concedes that

Bir Oifflrafa aind Ofira will have to be dismajitled, but the Eitam auid
26
Etzion fields are considered vital to Israel's national defense.
These two fields provide vital dispersal of Israel's aircraft, and
they also provide needed bases for l^iandling Israel's vastly increased
air force (it is three times larger now than in I967).

From Etzion

the Israeli air force is within quick striking distance of Shspnn el
2S
New York Times. 17 December 1977» p. 1.
^"All of Begin's peace proposals call for Israeli withdrawal far
beyond the areas where Bir Gifgafa and Ofira are located.
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Sheihk ajid the entire Gulf of Aquaba, while the Eitsim field provides
a superb field for protectin^r Israel's Mediterranean coastline.

To

move these fields into Israel proper would be enormously expensive
(one billion for Etzion alone), but they are located too far into the
Sinai to be included into any security corridor. If Ej^pt and Israel
can manage to resolve most of the other Sinai issues, one can expect
the United States to pay for relocation of these bases in order to
insure a peace settlement is reached.

Gaza Strip
There is no particular area of the Gaza Strip which possesses
any <rreat strate^^ic significance, but the area in its entireity is
viewed as being strategically significant by Israel,

The territory

juts into Israel proper and provides an excellent jumping off place
for a hostile force, since it lies dangerously close to Tel Aviv and
the heavily populated surrounding areas. Before the 196? War, the
presence of large numbers of Egyptian troops in the territory pro
vided a constant source of concern for the Israeli government.
Although the Israeli government might be persuaded to relinquish con~
trol over part or all of this territory, once can anticipate that
Israel would be extremely reluctant to retura it to Arab control if
any Arab military forces are to be stationed in it.

West Bank
In the West Beink territory there are two areas of major stra
tegic signficance to Israel.

The first is a string of mountains run

ning the length of the present Israel-Jordan cease fire line, while

3^
the second is the westernmost bulce of the West Bank area which
borders the narrowest part of Israel proper.

Since the West Bank

territory is so close to virtually all of the vital centers of Israel,
(Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa), most Israeli military strategists
have ar^ed that the first line of Israeli defense against an attack
from Jordan should be as close to the current Israel-Jordan cease
fire line as possible.

The best location for a defense line is the

low mountain range located approximately ten miles west of and par
allel to the cease fire line.

In early 1969, the Israeli government

adopted the Allon Plan which was designed to capitalize on the stiategic advantage offered by this range of mountains and eliminate some
27
of the strategic difficulties posed by Israel's narrow corridor, '
Under the original Allon Plan a chain of 20 paramilitary settlements
was to be constructed along these mountains, 11 north of Jericho along
the Jordan River and 9 more south of Jericho along the Dead Sea,

These

settlements were designed as a defensive line to stall any Jordanian
attack long before it reached Israel proper,

A crucial provision of

this plan was the Israeli insistence that no Arab military forces be
allowed in the West Bank area.

Quite obviously, most of the advan

tages of the Allon Plan would be negated if Arab military forces were
stationed in the populated area of the West Bank, beyond the Allon
Plan security border.

Israel's narrow corridor region refers to that portion of
Israel proper which begins approximately 5 miles south of Tel
Aviv and runs approximately 20 miles north of that city.
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At the tine of the Allon Plan's adoption, the Israeli govern
ment denied that this territory would be annexec by Israel, but it
did state that the line encompassed by these paramilitary settlements
would serve as Israel's final security boundary.

The Israeli govern

ment stated simply that Israel's political boundaries need not be
the same as its security boundaries, implying that Jordan might be

granted sovereignity over this area as long as the Israeli military
28
fortifications were allowed to remain in place.

The Allon Plan,

in various forms, has remained the basic West Bank policy for all
Israeli governments since 1969.

Even the policy of the Begin govern

ment, originally one of West Bank annexation, has been modified to
the point that it does not differ much from the basic Allon Plan.
Prime Minister Begin's policy of maintaining a continued Israeli
military presence in the West Bank while granting the Palestinian
Arabs administrative control over the territory's Arab residents
does not restrict the Israeli military presence to a few pre-designated
areas (as does the original Allon Plan), and it does provide for con
tinued Israeli control over Israeli religious settlements in the
territory.

One of the effects of the adoption of the Allon Plan was a
decreased emphasis upon the strategic significance of the West Bank
area lying adjacent to Israel's narrow corridor.

Under the pre-i967

War boundaries, this Israeli territory presented a major concern to
Israeli defense planners, because the distance between the hostile

^^Time, 7 February 1969» p. 25.
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Jordanian forces in the West Bank and the Mediterranean Sea was less
than

miles at the narrowest point and little more than 20 miles

at the widest.

Thus, an Arab military force in this area of the West

Bank would have to advance only a very short distance to cut Israel in
two.

Under the conditions of the Allon Plan, though, no Arab forces

would be allowed in the West Bank territory, so this narrow strip
of Israel becomes much less of a security liability.

At the time

of its adoption, the Allon Plan proved to be the most acceptable
solution for defense alon^? the West Bank front, since it did not
require annexation of large chunks of the occupied territory.

If

Israel is denied a military presence in the mountains along the Jordam
River and Dead Sea, then Israel would be forced to shift its efforts
to annexation of some territory along the West Bank's westernmost
bulge.

In Older to provide adequate security for this area, though,

Israel would have to annex a strip of territory between 5 and 8 miles
wide and close to 50 miles long.

Even this extensive an annexation

would not provide nearly the strategic advantage offered by the Allon
Plan, and it would do nothing to provide security for Jerusalem and
other Israeli territory bordering the West Bank.
Even under the conditions of the Allon Plan, though, the
Israeli governments have called for "cosmetic adjustments" in some of
the more strategically significant areas along this westernmost bulge
of the West Bank,

The most important of these is a small finger of

territory called Latrun (see map, page 6l) which juts sharply into
Israel proper.

The tip of this area lies within a few hundred yaxds

of the main highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem,

This highway is
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the oajor militaiy supply route between Israel's major port and
capital city, so unrestricted movement along this route is crucial
during; any Arab-Israeli war,

A small guerrilla force based in the

Latrun area could disrupt movement along this highway quite easily
and could even block this route for a long enough period (12 to 24
hours) to restrict severely Israel's ability to conduct a short term
war. Under the original Allon Plan, the area was designated for
29
annexation,
and it can be expected that in any negotiations con->
ceming the West Bank, Israel will insist upon its eumexation regEirdless of whatever other compromises are made.

Other strategically

significant sites include the small areas around Qalqilya and Tulkarm
(see map, page 6l),

The Qalqilya area lies a little less than 10

miles from the Mediterranean, and straightening out Israel's boundary
along this point would give Israel 2 more miles of leeway at Qalqilya,
The Tulkarm point is the second closest point to the Mediterranean, so
the Israelis' would like to widen their country slightly at this point.
These three areas are about the only areas in this pairt of the West
BaJik where any "cosmetic" adjustments need be made.

Any other border

straightening along this narrow corridor would require extensive juJditions of territory to Israel proper,
Golan Heights
In the Golan Heights the entire area is considered strateg
ically significant. Since the territory is quite small (444 square
29
Time, 7 February 1969t P. 25.
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miles ) and borders Israel's most hostile Arab neighbor (Syria), all
the Israeli governments since 196? have indicated that they had no
intention of making extensive compromises in the Golaui Heights,
Also, this area forms the headwaters of the Jordsm River, Israel's
major source of water. It is extremely important to Israel that this
water supply not be disrupted.

It is difficult to assess whether cer

tain areas of the Golan Heights are more strategically significant than
others, because two of the major features which determine an area's
military slgnflcance, elevation aiid proximity to Israel jnroper, are
not found in the same place in any part of the Golan Heights,

The

Heights is a sloping plateau which begins at about 500 to 700 feet
above sea level along the pre-1967 War boundary and rises quickly to
an altitude to 3#500 to 4,000 feet along the easteimmost reaches of
Israeli controlled territory.

Thus, all of the high ground is located

at the greatest distsmce from Israel proper, and since the territory
slopes gradually up all the way to the current cease fire line,
it is difficult to point out any one strip of territory running
across the Heights that is significantly easier to defend than a point
either In front or behind this designated strip.

Much of the Heights

is dotted with steep, irugged gorges which limit milltairy maneuver
ability, but the Golan Heights terrain, in general, is not rtigged
enough to prevent an invading army from deploying its forces widely.
Consequently, Israel could not choke off an invasion simply by con
trolling several key positions as is the case with the passes in the
Sinai,

In fact, the only good choke point is an area north of
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Quneitra, between that town and Mt, Hermon,*^
The apparent Israeli strate^ in the Golan Heights seems to be
one of keepin;;^ Syrian forces as far removed from Israel proper as
possible. Since the slightest compromise with the Syrians would have
Israeli forces backing downhill with Syriauis moving into advantageous
positions above, the Israelis* will probably limit any territorial con
cessions to the portion of the Heights farthest from Israel proper.
This approach leaves a little room for compromise in the central
GolaJi Heights area (around Quneitra) with very limited room for comXxromise in the northern end of the territory. Since the Israeli
territory north of the Sea of Galilee is dangerously vulnerable to
being pinched off against the sea, Israel cannot afford to allow
Syrian troops closer to Israel proper at one point than at another.
Given this situation, one can expect Israel to seek ajinexation of a
swath of Golan Heights territory of approximately equal width along
the entire length of the pre-i967 War boundary.

East Jerusalem
East Jerusalem is currently of some strategic significance to
Israel,

Prior to the 196? War it was of major strategic significance

because large numbers of Jordanian troops were stationed in that por
tion of the city, immediately awijacent to one of the major population
centers of Israel,
30

It is virtually impossible for a similar situation

During the 1973 War, 1 brigade of Israeli troops, supported
by 100 tanks, held off 2 Syrian divisions for 3 days in this area.
For am account of the battle, see Nadav Safran, Israeli The Embattled
Ally. (Cambridge, Masst Harvard University Press, 1978)» PP. 286-301,
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to developt though» since Israel would never allow any sizeable Arab
troop concentration to be stationed anywhere in the West Bank region.
The area does have strategic significance for prevention of terrorist
actst even if the West Bank is demilitarized.

No one in Israel wants

to see the Holy City divided by barbed wire and nine fields ^^;ain»
but this is a possibility should the area come under Palestinian
Arab control. If Israel controls the entire city, though, the antiterrorist measures (i.e,* checkpoints and electronic surveillance
devices) could be placed at the outskirts of the city, allowing for
unrestricted movement of Jerusalem's residents and visitors. The
most acceptable means for preventing terrorist attacks in Jerusalem
euid entry of Fsilestinian terrorists into Israel happens to be one of
the least acceptable political solutions for Jerusalem to the Arab
states.

It appears very likely that, if Israel is going to gain

Arab acceptance of an overall peace settlement, compromises will have
to be made in Jerusalem which could lesid to difficulties in control
ling movement of terrorists in and out of Israel through Jerusalem,
These problems controlling terrorists may well be the price that
Israel has to pay if it wants to gain other more important security
azrangements in the other occupied territories,

Lebanon
The territory in Lebenon, recently occupied by Israel, is of
some strategic significance now, though the long term stxrategic value
of this area to Israel is somewhat ambigious. In essence, Israel's
continued occuiation of the other territories is what led to the

problem In Lebanon.

Israel's adamant refusal to accept a Palestinian

state In the Middle East has been the prime notlvatlonal force for
the Palestinian resistance movement. As the strength of the Pales
tinians grew, they became a threat to several of the Arab states out
of which they operatedi first In Joxdam (until they were thrown out
of the country following a major military effort by King Hussein's
forces), and then In Lebanon,

It was the alignment of Palestinian

guerrillas with Lebanese Muslims which led to the Lebanese civil war
between Christians and Muslims and which left Palestinian guerrillas
with control over much of the area along the Leban-Israel border.
This gave the Palestinians an excellent staiglng area for guerrilla
foirays Into Israel, shelling of Israeli border settlements and the
unlnteirrupted training of new recruits. Thus, what was a relatively
peaceful boundary for Israel prior to the Six Day War has become
another security problem to be reconed with.
The Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon was a response to the
I^lestlnlan presence there, but It appears that the area will not be
a long-term strategic problem for Israel.

As long as the Palestinian

guerrillas pose the only threat In Lebanon, Israel need not be overly
concerned. The Palestinians possess neither the manpower nor the fire
power to threaten seriously Israel's existence, and any workable
peace settlement In the Middle East Is likely to dispell much of the
violently antl-Israel sentiment which fuels the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO).

However, this area could become strategically

significant If the Lebanese Muslims, allied with the PLO, mamage to
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fcain control of all Lebanon, In such a situation, Israel would have
to consider Lebanon as much of a threat as its other bordering Arab
neighbors.

In fact, Lebanon might become even more dangerous, since

a Muslim-dominated Lebanon would most likely become the haven for
militant Palestinians dissatisfied with whatever peace settlement is
worked out eventually.

If such a situation develops, and Israel comes

under increasing guerrilla attack from Lebauion, one can anticipate
that Israel would move into Lebanon smd occupy the airea north to the
Litajtti River, This occupation would square off Israel's northern
boundary, give Israel ample room to build solid defensive fortifications
and give access to the major water supply in the area. Currently,
Israel has shown little inclination to retain a permanent presence in
Lebanon,

Much of the occupied area has already been turned over to

United Nations forces, no plans for settlements have been announced,
and Isirael has not even set up a military government to administer the
area.

It appears very likely that Israel will not attempt to retain

aJiy of Lebanon in any final peace settlement.
Summary
It has already been noted that the only areas that can be con
sidered of major historical/religious importance are Eaist Jerusalem
and certain areas of the West Bank,
economic significance to Israel.

There are a number of areas of

In the Sinai, these include the

Rafiah Salient, the portion of the Mediterranean coastline between
El Arish and Barwadi Lagoon, and the area around Sharm el Sheihk,
The only other area of primary economic importance is the entire Golan

Heights territory. The areas of primary strategic significance in
clude Sharm el Sheibk^ Etzion and Eitam air basest and the crossroads*
Eilat and Rafiah Salient regions in the Sinai. The entire Golan
Heights and Gaza Strip territories have to be considered strategi
cally significant. In the West Bank, the security belt region along
the Jordan River and the Dead Sea is of prine importance, while
the Latrun, Tulkam and Qalqilya areas possess some strategic
significance.

East Jerusalem is strategically significant for pre

vention of terrorist attacks, while the recently occupied territory
in Lebanon is of little strategic Importance to Israel now (since the
guerrillas have been driven out), though it might prove valuable in
the future. Some of these areas possess both economic attraction and
security value, particularly the Golan Heights and Sharm el Sheihk,
and to a lesser extent, the Rafiah Salient, The joint attractions of
economic potential and strategic significance may not be overly Importaoit, though, since economic development tends to negate much of
an area's value as a buffer zone. It is Important to keep in mind
these areas mentioned avove dvirlng the course of discussion in the
next two chapters, because all of the areas noted above are of some
value to Israel, and actions taken to consolidate the Israeli presence
in some of these areas and the statements made to justify this
presence give a good indication of how Israel is attempting to balance
off economic interests and historical considerations against strategic
needs.

CHAPTER III
ISRAELI INTEGRATION AND CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Perhaps the most accurate indicator of Israeli intention to
retain control over a particular territory is seen in the actions
taken to integrate the territory with Israel proper or to consolidate
the Israeli hold on the area with settlements.

It is reasonable to

assume that the more interested Israel is in holding on to a territory
the more effort will be made to integrate the inhabitants of that ter
ritory into Israel proper and to place Israeli settlements in the terri
tory or portions of it.

Since the Israeli integration policies vary

somewhat with each particular territory, quite often these policy
differences serve as indicators of just how determined Israel is in
maintaining control of the area. The settlement policies of the Israeli
government also vary from territory to territory, and though these pol
icies do not serve as a strong indicator of the importance of a terri
tory in its entirety to Israel, they usually indicate which particular
portions of a given territory that Israel is going to make the most
effort to maintain control over.
With the exception of East Jerusalem, the Israeli's integration
and consolidation actions taken before August of 1973 were fairly
modest. The amount of Israeli settlement and development activity
was quite limited, and the Israeli governments had been reluctant to
44

^5
increase the Israeli presence.

In August of 1973 the governing Labor

Party changed courses and adopted a different policy as their party
platform for the upcoming elections. They advocated public and pri
vate purchase of Igind in the occupied territories, and extensive
development projects in the Gaiza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights
territories,^

At the time this policy was adopted by the Labor Pfeurty,

it Has believed that there was little if amy hope of getting any kind
of peace settlement with the Arabs for at least another four years.
Consequently, the Labor Party believed that the best course of action
was simply to "create** the peace settlement that it wanted without
worrying abour the ArabS* feelings in the matter. This policy an
nouncement served as one of the primary catalysts for the Yom Kipper
War, which prevented implementation of these Labor Party plans in
1973. Under the past two administrations, though, the Israeli govern
ment has moved, once again, toward a policy of creating the peace
settlement it wants.

The following discussion outlines the extent

of Israeli integration and consolidation actions taken up to early
1978,
Integration Actions
Administrative Integration Actions
All of the occupied territories have been integrated partially
into Israel, but none of the large territories (Sinai, Gaza Strip,
West Bank and Golan Heights) have been integrated totally as has East
Jerusalem,

On June 28, 1967* the Israeli government formally annexed

^New York Times. 23 August 1973f p. 2,
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East Jerusalem and some of the territoiry on the outskirts of the city.
Most of the public services, water, sanitation, telephone, electricity,
and bus systems had been integrated immediately following occupation,
and all barriers which formerly divided the city were torn down.
Street sipjns were posted in both Hebrew aaid Arabic, extensive plans
were made by the Jerusalem city council to modernize and improve the
formerly Jordanian sector, and representatives from the Jordanian
sector were elected to the Jerusalem Municipal Council,

Finally, no

restrictions were placed upon the free movement of people through the
newly unified city.

Residents of East Jerusalem are now considered

citizens of Israel and are granted all the rights available to Israeli

2
citizens under Israeli law.
Since none of the other territories have been annexed, either
in total or in part, they are administered by military governments
set up in four separate areas. These are the West Bank, the Golan
Heights, the Gaza Strip and Northem Sinai, and the "Solomon Area"
comprising the Southern Sinai,

These military governments are "care

taker" type governments which are designed to minimize hostility
between natives ajid the occupying forces and to maintain a minimum
level of change in the daily lives of Arab residents of the occupied
territories.

Each territory is headed by a military commaJider who

has a small staff of militejry personnel and Israeli civilian advisors.
In the sparsely populated areas such as the Golan Heights and the
Southern Sinai, the military commander's Civilian Affairs Staff

2
This East Jerusalem information comes from Richard H, Pfaff,
Jerusalem! Keystone of an Arab~Israeli Settlement. (Washington, D,C,i
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969)* P» 36,
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handles nost of the government functions. Howevert in the heavily
populated areas (Gaza Strip and West Bank), the civil service bureau
cracy which had existed prior to the war hats been kept intact.

These

Azab administrators are the ones who handle all the day to day activ
ities of government, and they are the ones with whom Arab citizens
deal with in their contacts with government. This Arab bureaucracy
is responsible to the military commander and is required to adhere
to the general policy guidelines set by the Israeli Minister of Defense,
who supervises the four military commanders governing the occupied
territories,^
Although certain differences exist in the manner In which dif
ferent territories are governed, many of these differences should be
interxxreted as responses to unique local conditions rather than
attempts to increase or less the degree of Integration of a partic
ular territory into Israel proper.

The administrative methods needed

to govern the nomadic Bedouin tribesmen of the Sinai vary consid
erably from the complex bureaucratic structure applied in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. There £U*e a number of policies though, which
serve as indicators of Israeli intentions concerning these occupied
territories. The type of legal system applied is one of these in
dicators.

In the initial stages of governing these four teirritories,

the Israeli's retained the legal systems which existed prior to the

^All of this information concerning Is3cael*s military goveimments
in the occupied territories comes from Nlmrod Baphaell, "Military
Government in the Occupied Territories," The Middle East Journal 23
(Spring 1969)« 177-190.
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Six Day War,

Thus, the southern Sinai was governed under the Egyptian

legal system, the Jordanian legal system was retained in the West
Bank, the Syrian legal system prevailed in the Golan Heights and
the Gaza Strip was administered under the British Mandatory legal
system.

By 1969* though, the Syrian legal system had been replaced

by Israeli civil law in the Golan Heights,

This is the only one of

the four military government districts which is currently governed
under Israeli civil law,^

Another location in which administirative measures indicate Israeli
intentions of retaining control over the axea in the Northern Sinai,
Since 1972 administrative actions have been taken to "encourage"
Bedouin tribesmen to leave the Mediterranean coastline area around
El Arish,^

When one realizes the extent of Israeli settlement taking

place in this area (a matter discussed later in this chapter), the
reasons for the Israeli policy of driving out the Arabs becomes
quite evident.

Also, certain administrative actions taken in the West

Bank indicate that Israel wishes to encourstge Jordan's interest in
regaining administrative control over the Palestinian Arags of the
territory. The West Bank is the only territory in which Israel allows
two legal currencies (Jordanian and Israeli),^ and it is also the only
4
Eliyahu Kanovsky, The Economic Impact of the Six Dav War.
(New YorkJ Praeger Publishers, 1970)• p. 199,
^Elizabeth Monroe, "The West Bankt Palestinian or Israeli?,"
The Middle Eaust Journal 31 (Autumn 1977)« ^0^.
^Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 147. In all the other occupied
territories the Israeli pound is the only legal currency.
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territory in which the former o*ner (Jordan) pays part of the salaries
7
of the civil administrators.

To a considerable extent the extensive

trade betHeen the West Bank and Jordan renders the currency situation
almost a matter of practical necessity, but the Israeli willingness
to allow Jozdan to continue to pay many of the civil administrators
of the West Beink indicates that Israel does not mind King Hussein's
efforts to maintain a Jordanian ixresence in the administration of the
area.

This activity on Jordan's part is not a practical arrangement

for Israel, since Israel pays all of the West Bank civil administrators
as well. The only purpose of the eirrangement seems to be that it serves
as a means of keeping Hussein connected with the affairs of the West
Bank,

Since most Israeli governments have indicated a preference for

an eventual Jordsmian administrative control over the West Bank, rather

8

than a Palestinian controlled area,

the Israeli acceptance of Hussein's

action merely confirms this belief.

Economic Integration Actions
In the area of economic Integration, the degree of integiration
between the economy of Israel and the economy of the occupied territory
is determined by a number of factors. These include (l) the lack of
restrictions concerning movement of produce and workers between the
occupied territory and Israel, (2) the similarity of wages between

^IMd,, p, 155.
O
The Begin government has adopted a policy of returning the West
Bank territory to Palestinian administrative control, though the con
ditions of this Palestinian control are so restrictive that Begin
believes, apparently, that Hussein's stabilizing Influence in the area
would not be necessary.
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the territory and Israel, suid (3) the degree to which government ben
efits guaranteed to Israeli workers have been extended to workers in
the occupied territory.
Under this rating system, the Golan Heights is clearly the most
integrated economically of the occupied territories.

Virtually no

economic barriers exist between the Golan Heights and Israel,

There

is no restricted entry into Israel on agricultural products from the
Golan Heights,

In the Heights jjublic works project employees and civil

servants are paid the same rates as in Israel, while in other terri
tories these employees recieve the same salaries which existed before
the war supplemented by cost of living increases,

Israel's Institute

of National Insurance (similar to the United States* Social Security
Administration) extends the saune benefits to Diruze workmen in the
Golan Heights as is provided to any Israeli citizen working in Israel
proper. Finally, in 1968 the Israeli government decreed that all wages,
fringe benefits, and old age pensions for Golan Heights inhabitants
would be the same as in Israel,^
In the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai, the Israeli government
has placed far more restraints on the economic integration of these
territories with Israel proper.

In these three texrrltorles, the Israe

li's primary concern immediately following the close of the Six Day
War was to revive the decimated economies of these teirritories and
provide employment and relief for the thousands of unemployed heads
of households.

In each of these territories, the Israelis* develoi)ed

9
Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 199.
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public works programs* set up employment eigenclest suid provided relief
for families which were unable to find any employment.

The Israeli

govemment provided a limited amount of capital investment to encourage
the growth of some light industry in the territories, and it also en
couraged limited private investment from Israeli sources. Finally,
the Israeli government allowed limited numbers of Arabs from occupied
10
territories to seek employment in Isirael,

All of these actions were

essentially "caretaker" in nature for, initially, the Israeli govemnent demonstrated a great reluctance to allow any more economic inte
gration between Israel and these three territories than was deemed
necessary.
The Israeli public works, job training, and welfare assistance
programs axe the most baisic example of the initial Israeli efforts to
avoid full economic integration.

Since the job training programs were

designed to prepaure Arabs for semi-skilled jobs in the territory in
which they resided, these programs minimized the economic Integration
between Israel and the territory receiving assistance.

Unfortunately,

these programs drained large financial sums from the Israeli treasxiry,
but made only a slight dent in the massive unemployment problem in the
occupied territories.

The Israeli government realized that if they

were to resolve the economic inroblems of these territories, they would
have to take a much more direct role in the economic process.
In the agricultural sector Israeli efforts were largely suc
cessful,

The agricultural developments of these three territories

^°Ibid., pp. 144-155» 178-184, 194-195.
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did not suffer much at all from the 196? fighting, so the Israelisdid not have to give a massive infusion of capital to revive production.
The problem that confronted the Israelis'' was the creation of a market
to absorb agricultural produce.

Since agricultural production in the

Sinai was quite small compared to the West Bank and Gaza Strip volume,
the Israelis* were not faced with a major problem in that territory.
Virtually all of the Sinai agricultural production (centered exclusive
ly around El Arish) was absorbed within the local economy, and what
little had to be exported to Israel posed no problem for the Israeli
economy.

Both the West Bank and Gaza Strip produced a much larger

volume of agricultural goods than the Sinai did, and their traditional
market sources (Eastern Europe for the Gaza Strip and Jordan for the
West Bank) had been cut off as a result of the war. Since the crops
produced in these two territories were the same kind of agricultural
produce grown in Israel proper, the Israelis* could not absorb the
agricultural production from these two territories without creating
severe problems within their own hard-pressed agricultural sector.
The Israelii* resolved the West Bank problem by reopening trade be
tween the West Bank and Jordan, thus returning the West Bank*s tra
ditional market.

Unfortunately, Israel did not have diplomatic

relations with most East European countries which constituted Gaza's
market.

Through extensive effort, though, Israel succeeded in creat

ing a market for Gaza Strip products in Westem Euirope, thus managing
to revive the agricultural industry of these territories while simul
taneously strictly limiting the flow of agricultural products from
these territories into Israel,
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The major step in resolving the occupied territories* unem
ployment problem was taken in 1968 when the Israeli government decided
to allow much greater integration of workers from the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank into the Israeli job market.

At this time the Israeli

economy was booming and needed additional workers, the Gaza Strip and
the West BaJik still suffered from high unemployment, so the logical
conclusion was reached. Although the workers from the occupied ter
ritories who did gain employment in Israel were paid Israeli wages,
they did not gain all of the benefits granted Israeli workers under
the Institute of National Insurance,

Also, the nxmber of Arabs from

the territories allowed to work within Israel was strictly limited,
since wages were considerably higher in Israel than in the territories.
By 1969 some 12,000 from the West Bank, 4,000 from the Gaza Strip, ajid

11
a scattered few from the Sinai were employed in Israel,

The number

of Arabs from occupied territories working in Israel gradually increeised until 1973* then tapered off as the Israeli economy turaed
sluggish.
To a considerable degree, the Israeli conviction that the econ
omies of Israel and those of the Gaza Strip and West Bauik would remain
separate ajid distinct entitles was unrealistic, given the conditions
vinder which the economies operated.

As Kanovsky pointed out, the Is

raeli decision to allow free trade between the territories and Israel
(with the exception of some restrictions on agricultural products), to
use a common cuirrency (Israeli pound), to allow the relatively free
^^Kanovsky, Economic Immct, p, I89,

movement of people between the territories and Israel, and to integrate
transportation routes between Israel's coastal plain and the terri
tories, insured the beginnings of a common market,^^

It appesirs that

whatever government does assume control of the Uest Bank and Gaza Strip
will be forced to retain contact with the Israeli market and the Is
raeli employment opportunities, at least until other economic sol
utions could be worked out.

Consolidation Actions
The most concrete expression of Israeli interest in retaining a
particular portion of an occupied territory is the extent of Israeli
settlement and development in that area.

It is doubtful that the

Israeli government would undertake any extensive settlement and de
velopment programs in an area unless it expected to retain Israeli
control over it under the tenns of an eventual peace settlement. In
the first place Israel cannot afford to sx)end vast sums of money on
constructing settlements and moving Israeli citizens into these
settlements aJid then abandon the settlements to the Arabs or spend
additional money to return the settlers and all their buildings and
equipment back to Israel,

In the second place the Israeli government

cannot afford the psychological cost that would result if Israel were
forced to abandon areas that both the Israeli settlers in the occupied
territories and the Israeli general public had expected to become part
of Israel,

In short, the longer that existing Israeli settlements

^^Ibid., p, 186,
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remain in paorticular portions of occupied territories, the more
difficult it Kill be to return to a situation which existed prior to
the ascent of the Israeli settlement effort.

As of January 1978 Israel had established over 90 settlements in
the occupied territories, and the Begin government had given approval
for more religious settlements in the West Bank,

Initially, little

settlement activity took place following the 196? War,

Gradually the

Israelis* began building a few paramllitaoy settlements in the Golan
Heights, then in the Sinai and the West Bank,

These settlements were

primarily for defensive purposes or for experimental agricultural
purposes (in the Sinai), though the bulk of Golan Heights settlements
were purely for jigricultursJ. exploitation.

It was not until after

the 1973 War that the Israelis* began building settlements in earnest.
By 1975 the concept of "creating facts" became the policy of the
Israeli government, and settlement building accelerated rapidly.
Under this policy the emphasis shifted from one of limiting settle
ments In the occupied territories in order to facilitate peace nego
tiations with the Arabs to a policy of building the settlements in
the areas Israel wished to retain its presence in and force the Arabs
to come around to accepting the situation. The Rabin government began
this policy, and the extensive settlement activity has continued under
the Begin administration, though the major emphasis has shifted to
the West Bank under Begin, while settlement activity under Rabin was
concentrated in the Sinai and Golan Heights,
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Slnal
Presently, there are over 25 Israeli settlements in the Sinai.
The most ambitious settlement effort undertaken by the Israelis* in
this territory is the creation of a new city named Yamit,

Yamit is

located on the Mediterranean coast in the Sinai territory just a few
miles south of the Gaza Strip's southern boundary (map on page 57
shows location of Sinai settlements). The Yamit develoimient, origin
ally conceived of by former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan as a city of
250»000, is presently designed to be an urbam regional center to serve
as Israel's third major Heditezrranean i)ort and to support a large
number of surrounding agricultural settlements. In December of 1975
only 23 families had moved into the "city" and only I85 housing units
heui been completed, but the site was being prepared for the construc
tion of 1,300 additional housing units, as well as some commercial
and industrial developments,^^ By January of 1978 over 2,000 settlers
lil
lived in Yamit, and some 22 settlements surrounded the town.
Cur
rently in the planning stages is a new settlement program which calls
for 10-15 more settlements to be constructed in the Raifiah Salient
in the next 3 years,Quite obviously, Israel is moving steadily
to consolidate its hold in this area.
The initial Sinai settlements consisted of three paramilitary
structures located in the northern Sinai region. These are the Nahal

^^New York Times. 13 December 1975» P» I6,
^^Economist. 11 February 1978, p, 61,
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Yamt a fishing canp located in the Baxvadi Lagoon region along the
Sinai*s Mediterranean coast, the Nahal Oiqla* a kibbutz located north
of El Arishf close to the Caza Strip boirder, and the NaJial Sinai» an
experimental farm located a few miles south of El Arish,^^ These
were the only Israeli settlements in this area of the Sinai until the
Yamit project came into being.

At the time of inception these three

small settlements appeared to be little more than experimental projects,
but the Yamit project will probably change these plans. The Nahal
Yam is simply too far removed to be included in the Yamit develo]^ent,
but the Nahal Sinai and Nahal Diqla could be integrated quite easily
into the Yauait project.
Of the remaining Sinai settlements, two are Just south of Kusseima
in the historic crossroads area, while another five are along the Gulf
of Aquaba, three along the highway leading to Sharm el Sheihk and two
at Sharm el Sheihk.

One of the Shaina el Sheihk settlements has been

in operation for several years (Ophir), but the remainder of these
settlements along the Gulf of Aqtiaba and near Kusseima have been built
since 1975. The settlements in the Kusseima region appear to be an
effort to establish a presence in the strategically significant cross
roads.

On the other hand, the ones along the Gulf of Aquaba and in

Sharm el Sheihk appear to be primarily tourist camps and resorts,

Ophir,

for example, is a large resort area with over 100 trailers and bunglows
17

set up for tourist accomodation,

^^Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 195«
^^New York Times. 2 May 1971» sec XX, p, 28,
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Gaza Strip
The only Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip other than the
previously mentioned agricultural settlements affiliated with Yamit
are three paramilitary settleoents scattered the length of the teirritoiy.

The location of Gaiza settlements indicates that Israel is

in a good position to consolidate its hold on the areas of the Gaza
Strip within the Rafiah Salient region, but the remainder of the
territory evidences no settlement concentration. These three para
military settlements are too small and too scattered to be of much
military value, so it would be quite easy to have them removed.
There appear to be no plans within the Israeli government at present
to expand around any of the axeas of these three paramilitaiy camps.

West Bank
The development of the Israeli settlements in the Vest Bank
territory was somewhat different than in the other teirritories.
Immediately following the 196? War, no settlements were allowed in
the territory. Several of the religious parties in Israel strongly
desired to create Jewish settlements in former Jewish holy areas, but
were frustrated by government i)olicy.
matters into their own hands.

They solved the problem by taking

In early 1968 a youth group from Gush

Emunim declared their intention of settling in Kfir Etzonia, halfway
between Jerusalem and Hebron, with or without government permission.^®

^®Stephen Oren, "Continuity and Change in Israel's Religious
Parties," The Middle East Journal 2? (Winter 1973)« 50.
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This statement created enough public support for the action that the
fcovemment was forced to allow the ^^Jroup to go ahead. Another major
settlement in the West Baink followed a similar initiative by Gush
Emunim supporters who attempted to move into Hebron in 1968. This
move was opposed by Moshe Dayan (at the time formulator of government
policy for goveiming the territory) who did not want to alienate the
Palestinian Arabs living in Hebron,

The Israeli government com-

xxromised by creating a new Jewish town in the suburbs of Hebron called
Kiryat Arba,

This town contained an initial population of 1,000

emd was designed to include furhter expansion.
Once that the actions of the religious lairties had broken the
ban on settlement in the West Bank, the government modified its policy
and in late 1969 began to implement the Allon Plan for settlements
along the Jordan River and Dead Sea. Within a yeatr's time, five more
paramilitary encampments had been set up along the Jordan River,
Between 1970 and 1973 there was little settlement activity in the West
Bank territory. Following the October War, the Israeli government
accelerated its settlement construction along the security belt area.
By 1977 some l6 settlements were operational north of Jericho and
4 nore had been constructed south of Jericho,

Given the large area

noirth of Jericho along the Jordan River, it is somewhat difficult to
comprehend that Israel has achieved total domination over the area
with just l6 settlements, though this is the case. For one thing

l^Monroe, "The West Bank," p. -ifOO.
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Israel has converted several of the paramilitary settlements into
civilian agricultural settlements populated by Gush Eraunim members.
In several instances the Israelis* merely confiscated much of the
20

cultivable land in an area and drove out the Arab farmers.

The

Is3caeli's most effective technique has been to appropriate the few
wells in the area or to dig its settlement wells in such locations
21
as to draw off all the water from surrounding Arab wells.

Deprived

of their source of water, most Arab farmers living in the area were
forced to leave.

By the end of 1977 virtually the entire area enclosed

within the "Limit of Settlement Road" (see map, page 6l) is populated
exclusively by Israelis*, though only 900 settlers reside within the
area.22
Between 1973 an'^ Begin*s election in 1977t Gush Emunim pioneers
had accomplished a few successful efforts at establishing maverick
settlements in the West Bank, but they had never enjoyed the extent
of supi>ort that the Begin government offered for their activities.
Once in office, Prime Minister Begin proved much more willing to
extend legal status to maverick settlements eind to propose further
settlements for religious party members.

By 1978 settlements had

sprouted up all over the West Bankj four at Kfir Etzonia, two in
Latrun, two at Ramallah, one outside Nablus, emd several scattered
along the West Bank area bordering the narrow corridor region of
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., pp. 401-403,
^^Ibid.. p. 403.
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Israel proper.

Under the Begin government the number of settlers in

the West Bank grew to over

early 1978.^^ This figure is even

more impressive when one realizes that Israel is finding it extremely
difficult to find adequate numbers of settlers to populate all of the
settlements constructed. The large Gush Emunim settlement of Kiryat
Arba has doasens of apartments lying empty, which is often the case
with other West Bank settlements.

Even the extremely crowded housing

conditions within Israel and the added attraction of very low rent in
the occupied territory fail to induce settlers to move into West Bamk
developments. The Begin government has responded by coming up with a
plan to eliminate some of the isolationist problems which deter
Israelis* from moving to West Bank settlements. Some of its features
include better roads, better communications and better shopping facil24
ities.

It appears that the only thing slowing down the extent of

Israeli West Bank settlement under the Begin administration is the
fear of American reprisaJ. action if their objectives become too
obvious.
In her article Elizabeth Monroe argues that all the Israeli
governments from Heir's to Begin's were, in effect, following a policy
of creeping annexation, with the objective of gaining control over a
large portion (if not all) of the West Bank territory,

Monroe cor

rectly points out that all of these governments were dependent upon
support from Israel's religious parties for their survival in the

^^Economlst. 11 February 1978, p, 6l,
^^Monroe, "The West Bank," p, 410,

6k
Israeli Knesset» and as a consequence had to go along with Gush Emunln
demands for annexation of all of the West Beink Into Israel. There
is little proof that the Meir ^^ovemraent advocated this policy, and
not that much more evidence which can support this argument in the
case of the Rabin government.

It can be shown, however, that both the

Meir government and the Rabin government encountered extreme oppo
sition from the Gush Emunlm faction of the religious parties when they
adopted policies of returning portions of the West Bank containing
Israeli settlers under the terms of an eventual peace agreement.

The

Gush Emunlm opposition made it very difficult for labor Party govern
ments (such as Meir*s and Rabin's) to oppose the Gush Emunlm policy
of retaining all of the West Bank, but it did not mean that they
supported West Bank retention,

Rabin did allow for more Gush Emunlm

settlement in the West Bank than Meir did, but Rabin followed a pat
tern of accepting these settlements within the confines of the security
belt while discouraging them elsewhere in the West Bank,

This patteim

of Gush Emunlm settlements is in line with Rabin's policy of creating
facts, of making the Israeli presence so dominating within the portions
of the occupied territories desired for annexation (or at least re
tention of Israeli control) that the Arabs would have to accept the
situation.

It is quite possible that Rabin believed that he could

trade off the religious settlements around Hebron, Ramallah and Nablus
against the ones in the secxurity belt region.
Regardless of Rabin's Intentions, his policies left a solid
wall of Israeli-dominated territory along the Joxxlan River.

Prime
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Minister Begin has merely extended the policy of creating facts to
a Buch larger pairt of the West Bank.

In fact, Israeli settleaents

in the patrt of the West Bank outside the security belt region have
been going up so fast that it is alnost inpossible to keep track of
them (every newspaper and nagazine article one reads on the subject
has a different total). Somewhere between 44 and 48 settlements are
now present in the West Bank* and the Begin government has a program
in the planning stage which calls for 20 to 25 more in the next 3
years,Although

Prime Minister Begin has announced his intention

to return the West Bank to Palestinian administrative control even
tually, his policy seems to be one of gaining Israeli control over
as much of the territory as possible before the Palestinians take
over. The Monroe thesis, then, is quite accurate for the Begin ad
ministration, because Begin*s government has placed no restrictions
concerning which areas of the West Bank can be subject to Israeli
consolidation activity. The West Bank policy of Prime Minister Begin
is discussed further in Chapter IV,

Golan Heights
The most consistent Israeli settlement activity has taken place
in the Golan Heights, The Israeli government began building settle
ments in this teixitory immediately following the close of the 196?
War and have almost exhausted the possibilities In the territory,
a 1969 master plan for the Golan Heights estimated that the agricultural
^^Economlst. 11 February 1978, 6i,
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potential of the territory would allow for a maximum of 20 settlements.

The fact that Israel has already exceeded this orifcinal

estimate by at least 5 settlements indicates the extent to which
Israel has consolidated its hold over the territory (see mapi page 67).
Unlike many of the Israeli settlements in other occupied territoriesf
most of the early Golan Heights settlements were civilian rather than
military. The willingness to begin immediately exploiting the agri
cultural potential of the territory serves as a good indication of
the Israeli commitment to remaining in the atrea.

Israel has even con-

27

stanicted a ski resort in the area on Mt, Hermon, ' Still, the Israeli
presence in the area is quite small (only 3»700 by early I968), given
the fact that some 85,000 Syrians lived in the territoiry prior to the
Israeli occupation. Yet, even this small number of civilians creates
major problems for milltaury strategists, because the territory is so
small (444 square miles) that there is no way of keeping the civilians
from being cavight right in the middle of any fighting. The Golan
Heights is also the territory most succeptlble to attack. The Syrians
are Israel's most hostile enemy, aaid they have a maisslve militsiry
force positioned within easy striking distance of the entire Golan
Heights area. The willingness of the Israeli governments to press
for settlement of this territory, despite the military drawbacks, in
dicates the strength of the Israeli commitment to remaining in the
area.
^^KaJiovsky, Economic Impact, p, 200,
^"^New York Times. 15 February 1975# P« 10,
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1 Neve Atlv
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3 Har Odem
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7 Ur Tal
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9 Keshet
10 Aniam
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Christian Science Monitor, l6 October 1978, p, 3
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The i)articulax concentration of settlements in the Heights is
not always an accurate indicator of which territory is the most im
portant for Israel, The vast majority of the settlements are located
in the small area of the Heights "between the southeastern shoreline
of the Sea of Galilee and the Syrian cease fire line. Superficially,
this would seem to indicate that this area is more important to Israel
than the remainder of the Heights, Although Israel is definitely inter
ested in expanding the snail (and extremely vulnerable) strip of Israeli
territory which lies along the southeastern shore of the Sea of
Galilee, the concentration of settlements might well be more indicitive of military and agricultural conditions in the Heights than of
Israeli annexation intentions,

A considerable portion of the Heights

north of the Sea of Galilee is used by Israel as cattle grazing land.
This area is also the primaiy route for any Syrian military force
attempting to invade Israel, Since cattle ranching does not require
many settlements over a relatively lairge area, and military defense
lines function most effectively with the least possible civilians
along them, it stands to reason that the Israeli government is not
going to construct very many civiliain settlements in the area regard
less of how much they desire to annex the territory.

Yet, one csin

expect that the extensive settlement in this area would be the final
place of compromise for Israel, simply because it is much easier to
compromise in an area which would affect fewer settlers (such as
the forward areas around Quneitra),
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Conclusion
The Israeli integration and consolidation actions in the occupied
territories point out a few general conclusions. The first is that
the Israeli administrative activities are somewhat indicitive of what
Israel plans to do about the Arab residents of occupied territories,
but in most cases they do not provide solid evidence concerning Israeli
intentions regarding the final disposition of a territory. For in
stance the administrative actions taJcen in the Golan Heights indicate
that Israel is willing to integrate the Druze residents of that axea
into Israel, The integiation is quite easy to do since there are
only 5»000 of them, and Israel already has a Druze population within
the country which has been so thoroughly integrated into Israeli
society that its members even serve in the armed forces.

In the

Sinai the Israeli activities in "thinning out" the Bedouin tribesmen
along the northern Mediteiraiiean coastline indicate the seriousness
of the Israeli commitment to maintaining control of the Rafiah
Salient area.

In the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Israeli admin

istrative activities indicate that Israel has little interest in
integrating the Palestinian residents of these teirritories into
Israeli society,

Israeli disinterest in integrating Palestinian

Arabs is not necessarily indicative of Israeli expaoisionist intentions
in either the West Bank or Gaza Strip, Previous Israeli administrations
made repeated efforts to "thin out" the Arab population of the Gaza
Strip in order to facilitate annexation,and the recent Israeli
PQ

See Kanovsky, Economic Impact, p, 181, and Time. 7 February
1969* p. 25, for details.
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settlement activity in the West Bank, which increasingly forces
out the neij^hboring Arabs, is just another version of the same policy.
The Israeli actions of economic integration taken in the terri
tories show two signfiicant results. The first is that the Golan
Heights is becoming, for all intents and purposes, a i>art of Israel,
The second, and most Important, development is that the limited
degree of economic integration between Israel and the two most popu
lated territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is leading to
a common market situation.

Potentially, this developing common

market could become very important for a peaceful resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

When the United Nations partitioned

Palestine in 19^8, it envisioned separate Arab auid Jewish states
joined in economic union.

At the time of the partition planning,

the location of the Jewish amd Arab populations within Palestine and
disproportinate wealth of the Jews led the United Nations commission
to conclude that the boundairy lines drawn would, of necessity, create
an impossible security sirrangement, but it was hoped that the degree
of economic dejjendence developing between the separate states would
tend to minimize hostilities.

Since the economic and security sit

uation confronting the Israelis* and the Palestinians today is very
similar to the 19^8 situation, the developing economic dependence
between Istael and the Palestinian Arabs could play a vital role in
easing tensions, should West BaJik and Gaza Strip Palestinians become
independent.
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In quite a nunloer of areas the Israeli consolidation actions
coincide with Israel's strategic, economic, and historical interests
in the occupied territories. This is most evident in the Golan
Heights. The extent of Israeli consolidation over and integration of
this territory is so extensive that this strategically and economically
imjjortant area virtually has become a part of Israel.
In the Sinai and Caza Strip the particular direction of recent
settlement activity emphasizes the Reufiah Salient area at the expense
of the Sharm el Sheihk region and the entirity of the Gaza Strip,
Previous Israeli governments placed considerable emphasis upon the
strategic significance of the Sharm el Sheihk area. The Begin admin
istration has not increased the extent of settlement in the area,
has made no further efforts to exploit the oil potential in the eurea,
and appears to be downplaying the strategic significance of it. The
increasing emphasis that Israel is placing upon the security impor
tance of the airfield at Etzion (from which planes can reach Sham
el Sheihk quickly) is am indication of Israeli efforts to find altern
atives to the Sharm el Sheihk occupation.

Also, it appears that Begin

believes Egypt will be more willing to accept compromises in areas
close to the pre-1967 War Egypt-Israel boundary than it will be to
accept compromises in areas close to the Suez Canal.
One of the ireasons that Prime Minister Begin Is concentrating
upon the Rafiah Salient region is that it has more to offer than
Sharm el Sheihk.

The Rafiah Salient has economic attraction for

agricultural pirposes, it has great potential as an oil producing
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region, and even greater economic potential as Israel's third port
on the Mediterranean,

Strategically, the area is valuable because it

provides a means of cutting off the Gaza Strip from Egypt,

Under

this kind of arrangement, the Gaza Strip becomes much less of a strategic
liability (just as the West Bank becomes much less of a strategic
liability with Israeli forces stationed in the security belt region).
Until the extensive settlement auid develop«ent activity took place in
the Rafiah Salient, the general policy of the Israeli goveimments
was to call for annexation of the Gaza Strip in its entirety,

With

the onset of the Yamit project in 1975f the Rabin and Begin govern
ments have modified this Gaza Strip policy.
Recent develoi»nents in the West Bank demonstrate the primacy
of historical and religious considerations under Prime Minister
Begin,

The most important strategic location of the West Bank had

been consolidated completely under Rabin, so the Begin government
had no vital need to increase the Israeli presence in the territory.
Prime Minister Begin's political party has always been committed to
incorporating Israel's biblical regions of Judea and Sauaaria (essen
tially the West Bank), so it comes as no suprise that his consolidation
efforts would center in the West Bank area.

Prime Minister Begin's

concentration upon the West Bank region, though, has impoirtant impli
cations for what might happen in the other occupied territories and in
the Middle East,

These implications are discussed in Chapter IV.

CHAPTER IV

ARAB AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
Political Developments 1967-1978
Before advancing to a discussion of specific territories* some
general comments are made concemin«;c developments in nef^otiations be
tween 1967 and the present.

Althou^rh the cease fire of June 10, 1967f

stopped the fijcchtin^r in the Middle East, it did not end the wax as
far as the Arabs were concerned.

The Arab states viewed the cease

fire as nothina; more than another temporary truce in their 20 year
old war asrainst Israel,

Thus, at the time of the conclusion of the

Six Day War, none of the borderinjr Arab states had ever been willing
to accept the presence of Israel in the Arab Middle East.

Any con

sideration of the Israeli boundary issue, therefore, was out of the
question.

In the first peace proposal advanced following the Six

Day MeiT, Israel demanded a change in Arab attitudes and a change in
Israel's boundary by initiating the "secure and recognized" borders
argument,

Egypt and Jordan made the first major concession in the

deadlock by offerinst statements of recoernition of Israel's right to
exist as a state, and Syria finally announced willingness to accept
Israel following the 1973 War, The Palestine Liberation Organization
has yet to offer a concrete statement of acceptance of Israel's right
to exist, though PLO leader Yassir Arafat has indicated at times that
such a statement would be forthcoming if it were politically feasible
(the PLO's Israel position is discussed later in this chapter),
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7^
Israel did not acree to any concessions at all until after the

1973 War, and even these concessions in the Sinai and Golan Heifa^hts
disen^a^^ement agreements were moderate in scope.

Of course, Israel

had not been accustoaed to thinking in terms of concessions to the
Arabs prior to 1973#

The relative ease with which Israel had won

the 1956 and 196? camiJaigns against Arab forces had convinced the
Israelis* that the Arab forces could be easily defeated in any armed
conflict.

Thus the Israeli policy prior to 1973 essentially was one

of sitting it out indefinitely in the occupied territories until the
Arabs finally agreed to the peace terms dictated by Israel,
The Arab success on the battlefield in the 1973 War shattered
the myth of Israeli invincibility, causing a traumantic reaction in
Israel's domestic political scene.

As soon as the October War had

ended, vicious political bickering broke out between the rival right
juid left wing factions of the ruling Labor Party, which left the Meir
government with bajrely enough support in the Knesset to continue
governing the country.

In March of 197^ an investigation assessing

the responsibility for the failure of Israeli intelligence in the
early stages of the Yom Kipper War resulted in the collaspe of the
Meir government and the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.
The Rabin government replaced the Meir government, but it enjoyed no
more than a two vote majority in the Knesset, so it was forced to
negotiate with the Arabs while struggling for suirvival at home.
The Arabs, on the other hand, found themselves in the most
advantageous position that they had ever held against Israel.

The
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Efl^yptians and Syrians had proven on the battlefield that the Arabs
were no longer a military force that could be dismissed, and by doing
so they had won a great psychological victory in the conflict (while
Israel suffered a large psychological defeat).

The Arab successes on

the battlefield led to a new Arab unity, causing Israel to be faced
with a united Arab front at the negotiating table*

Finally, the

Arab oil embargo following the war caused oil prices to skyrocket,
bringing immense wealth to oil rich Arab nations and transforming them
immediately into major political powers on the international scene.
The Middle East political situation at the time of the Sinai suid
Golan Heights disengagement agreements, then, showed a complete re
versal of the situation which existed prior to the October War,
was the Israelis

It

who were lacking confidence, politically divided,

and fighting among themselves, while the Arabs appeared united and
confident of victory.

The Arab states continued to press a hard line

policy concerning boundary locations, though, curiously enough, the
sudden assumption of power by the Arabs led to a more conciliatory
rather than a more hostile attitude towards Israe,

The Sinai and

Golan Heights disengagement agreements were not marked by any major
concessions by either side, but they did mark the first time that
either Egypt or Syria had signed any agreement with Israel other than
a cease fire accord.

Also, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and

Syria's President Assad expressed positive views toward such subjects
as a signed peace agreement with Israel, demilitarized zones within
their own countires, and anus limitation agreements, all of which had
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been taboo i>rior to the 1973 War,^

At this time, though, the Arabs

held the upper hand in the negotiations, and they appeared confident
that Israel would be forced to give back all of the occupied territory.
Consequently, they could afford to offer more concessions on periph
eral issues, since a return of all the occupied territory would con
stitute a major diplomatic victory for the Arabs,
Altho\igh the Arabs held the upper hand in 197^» Israel realized
that the united Arab fron rested on a very precarious foundation.
Vast differences existed between the Arab states in terms of wealth,
political ideology, military strength, and economic potential, and
many Arab states held long standing rivalries, disputes and outright
conflicts with other Arab nations.

These basic conflicts among the

Arab states led to a gradual disintegration of Arab unity and an
eroding of the advantageous negotiating position enjoyed by the Arabs,
From 1975 on both Israel and many of its primary Arab opponents suf
fered through extended periods of internal (and in some cases external)
political crisis, while clear-cut Israeli military superiority pro
vided the stabilizing factor for maintaining an uneasy peace during
the period.
Two major changes affecting the dispute took place in 1977»
first was the election of Henachem Begin

as

The

Israel's prime minister

in June, suid the second was Anwar Sadat's i)eace initiative in

^Assad's comments on these subjects are in Time, 3 February 1975»
p, 39* and Newsweek. 3 March 1975# P, 3^» while Sadat's views are
expressed in Time, 3 February 1975» PP, 38"39, Time, 14 April 1975»
p. 37» and the New York Times. 12 February 1975» P» 3»
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November,

The election of Begin changed considerably the Israeli

negotiating position.

Begin switched the major territorial emphasis

to the West Bank (instead of the Golan Heights and Sinai), and in
geneiral advanced a much more hard line bargaining position. The
Sadat trip to Jerusalem served as a draj#atic announcement of Egypt's
recognition of Israel as a Middle East nation, though Saidat did not
moderate his peace proposals at that time.
The Camp David summit of September 1978 led to a major break
through in the Egypt-Israel dispute, as well as agreement by Sadat
eind Begin upon a firework for Middle East peace. Since this "frame
work" has not been accepted by any other Middle East nation (or the
PLO), the future of this Middle East peace airrangement remains in
doubt.

The substance of the Camp David peace framework and the

likelihood of its being accepted are discussed at length in the
West Bank/Caza Strip negotiations section in this chapter, as well
as in Chapter V,
Negotiating Positions
Sinai
The arrangements agreed upon at the Camp David summit and sub
sequent events in Israel virtually have resolved the Sinai question.
The essence of the agreement is that Israel will return the entire
Sinai to Egyptiait sovereignty and remove all military forces and
civilian settlements in return for Sadat's acceptance of full normal
ization of relations between E^pt and Israel,

This normalization

of relations means full diplomatic relations between Israel and E^pt
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auid no economic boycotts or barriers to free movement of goods ajnd
people between the two nations.

The details of this agreement are

included in Chapter V,
It should be realized that many of the "concessions" of the
Camp David summit represent very little compromise in previous po
sitions, since El^pt and Israel had been quite close to agreement in
the past over the issues separating them in the Sinai,

In December

of 1977 Prime Minister Begin announced acceptance of E^gyptian sov
ereignty over the entire Sinai, though he insisted that Israeli troops
would remain in a security corridor region along the p3:e-1967 War
boundary and that the Israeli civilian settlements would remain in
2
place.

President Sadat had accepted the concept of normalization of

relations between Egypt auid Israel as early as i975» though he in
sisted that this development would take place only after a compre
hensive Middle East peace treaty had been signed. Also, Sadat had
agreed to limiting Egyptian forces in the Sinai and creating demil
itarized zones, though he had asked for a reciprocal demilitarized
zone on the Israeli side (which is part of the agreement),^

Finally,

it was generally acknowledged that the United States would pay for
relocation of the Israeli's strategic Sinai air fields in the event
of a settlement between Egypt and Israel^(President Carter has agreed
to finance relocation of Israel's Sinai airfields). The Israeli

^New York Times. 17 December 1977# P. 1»
^New York Times. 12 February 1975* P» 3*
^Time. 13 February 1978* P» ^5.
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withdrawal of its armed forces from the Sinai is a concession Israel
had not 845i«ed to in the past, but the 20 to 40 kilometer wide
demilitarized zone (occupied by United Nations forces) lying west of
the international boundary and the Gulf of Aquaba accomplishes the
same purpose as a security corridor, so Israel, in effect, gains its
objective.
Since so many of the details of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement
were already close to being resolved, the agreement was reached by
a trade off of one major Israeli concession for two Egyptian ones.
Basically, Prime Minister Begin agreed to remove completely the
Israeli presence in the Sinai (both military and civilian) in retura
for President Sadat's acceptance of full diplomatic relations with
Israel and agreement to an overall peace framework which called for
recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and
their just requirements," rather than a specific declaration of
Palestinian rights to self determination (which Sadat haul insisted
ujwn in the past).
The Camp David agreement indicates the extent of the emphasis
shift between the Begin government and the previous Labor fturty
governments. The labor governments since 19^7 tended to place con
siderable emphasis upon retaining an Israeli presence in portions
of the Sinai territory.

All of the Labor governments adopted a policy

of retaining direct Israeli control (either through annexation or
some kind of leasing arrangement) over the corridor of land running
along the Gulf of Aquaba to Sharm el Sheihk. The Rabin government
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took the initiative in pusbin#^ Israeli consolidation actions in the
Rafiah Salient area following the 1973 War, and it also sponsored
much of the oil exploration in the Sinai, agricultural development
in the Rafiah Salient, and the /gradual relocation of Beudoin from
the El Arlsh area.

Althou^arh Be^in Initially adopted a policy of

retaininpc the Sinai settlements and retaining an Israeli military
presence in the Sinai, obviously Begin believed that the West Bank
was far more important to Israel than any part of the Sinai,
Another reason for Begin being willing to give up the entire
Sinai, though, is that he realized that the Egyptiaun offer to norm
alize relations was too important to pass up,

A separate peace with

E^ypt is vitally Important for Israel, because it gives Israel a
level of security it has never experienced before.

Without Egyptian

troops, the Arab opponents of Israel currently axe in no position to
pose much of a military threat to Israel.

In addition to giving

Israel unprecedented security, it also leaves Israel in a most ad
vantageous position in any future Middle East peace negotiations.
The advantages Israel gains by Egypt's defection from the united Arab
front are discussed later in this chapter.

West Bank/Oaza Strip
Since the Hest Bank and Caza Strip territories are the focal
point of the Palestinian issue, they will be discussed jointly.

In

these two territories, the negotiating positions of the opposing sides
are considerably at odds. The basic belief of Rrime Minister Begin
concerning these territories is that they are Israeli territory and
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that they belon;:^ to the Jewish people.

Since there are other claims

to the territory, however, the question of sovereignty should be left
open at present.

Prior to the Camp David summit. Prime Minister

Befrin's proposals included* (i) Israeli military control over the
territory, (2) eventual Palestinian civilian control over Palestinian
Arabs in the teirritories, and (3) no Palestinian state,^ The Arabs
have countered with a basic demand for complete Israeli withdrawal
(military and civilian) and self determination for the Palestinian
people.
The Arab position in the West fiank is somewhat complicated
because it is not entirely clear how the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Arabs are )!?oin;^ to be represented in negotiations. Since the 197^
Arab summit conference, the Palestine Liberation Organization has
been designated as the only legitimate representative of the Pales
tinian i)eople in peace negotiations. The PLO's public position for
some time has been as follows 1 (l) all Palestine belongs to the
Palestinian Arabs, (2) the PLO will accept nothing less than the
destruction of the Jewish state, and (3) Palestine will be governed
by a secular Arab government under which Jews will be permitted to
reiaain.

Privately, it appears that the PLO is resigned to an Israeli

state in the Middle East, but will insist upon nothing less than com
plete Israeli withdrawal from the territories suid the formation of
^Newsweek, I6 January 1978, p, 40,
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a Palestinian state.^ In general» Israeli governments have attempted
to negotiate the Palestinian issue with Jordam.

King Hussein of

Jordan maintains a public position of demanding Israeli withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with the final disposition of
the territory to be worked out between Hussein and the Palestinisms.
The agreements reached at Camp David changed the direction of
peace negotiations* though it did not change markedly the Israeli
position.

Basically, the Middle East peace framework worked out

at Caunp David was am effort to resolve the West Bjuik and Gaza. Strip
issues by ciircumventing the PLO. The major points of the framework
are as followsi (i) Israeli military government and civilian admin
istration will be replaced by a self governing authority elected by
the inhabitants of the two territories, (2) Egypt, Israel and Jordan
will agree on the modality for establishing the elected self-governing
authority in the two territories, (3) ftilestinians from within the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (or other Palestinians as mutually agreed
upon) will be allowed as members of Egypt's or Jordan's delegation
to negotiations, (4) Parties to the negotiations will define the
powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority,

(5) A withdrawal of Israeli forces will take place and the remaining
Israeli forces will be redeployed into specific security locations.
(6) Security arrangements will be negotiated by the parties, though
a strong local police force (which could include Jordanian citizens)
would be created. (?) Once the self-governing council is established,

^Leon Wieseltier, "Interview with General Peled," New York Review
of Books, 23 Februairy 1978, p. 17. Peled (a retired Israeli Major Gen
eral) has had numerous unofficial contacts with the PLO.
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a 5 year transition period will "begin.

Not later than 3 years after

the beginning of this transition period, negotiations Kould take
place to determine the final status of these two territories and
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. This final agree
ment is supposed to recognize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and their just requirements,"'^
It is apparent that Israel has made few concessions on the West
Bank and Gaza. Strip issue.

Begin did agree to remove some of the

Israeli troops, "but the agreement contains no provisions insuring
eventual Israeli military withdrawal from the territories, it says
nothing about Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
and it contains no guarantees of eventual Palestinian self determination.
In fact. Prime Minister Begin stated that he intended to press Israel's
claims to the territory in the negotiations for final resolution of
O
the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
It is apparent, then, that Prime
Minister Begin views the firamework as a means of resolving the West
Bank and Gaza Strip issue without the PLO, and also a meaJis of pre
venting the formation of a separate Palestinian state.
The issue which lies at the heart of the West Bsmk and Gaza
Strip problem (in fact which is the core problem of the entiire Middle
Bast dispute) is the question of Palestinian self determination. It
has been noted previously that the entire history of Mandated Pales
tine was little more than a continuous struggle between Jews and
"^The Washington Post, 19 September 1978, p. l6, contains a text
of the Middle East peace framework.
^Ibid.

m-

Palestinian Arabs over ultijnate sovereignty in the eurea. The 19^8
United Nations solution to the problem recognized both sides*
claims to sovereignty by creating separate nations, a solution which
was acceptable to the Jews at the time. Then it was the Arabs who
refused to acknowledge Israel's claims to sovereignty, forcing Israel
to fight an intermittent 30 years war before Arab states began accept
ing Israel's claims.

Now, ironically enough, it is the Israeli's

intransigence which suppresses the Palestinians' desire for self
determination, and which threatens to destrx)y current possibilities
for a Middle East peace settlement.
It roust be recognized that, to a considerable extent, the Begin
government's opposition to a Palestinian state is as much a matter of
strategy as principle.

If the Israeli government accepts the concept

of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories,
then something is going to have to be done about the settlements in
these territories, particularly the West Bank,

Under any kind of

Palestinian self determination arrangement, Israel has three choices
of what it can do with the settlementsi (l) press for annexation of
as much Israeli-populated West Bank territory as possible, (2) leave
the settlers subject to a Palestinian government, or (3) evacuate the
settlements. The political consequences resulting from any of these
choices would create serious problems for Israel,

If Israel adopts a

policy of annexation, it would have to take much of the West Bank
territory along with it. This policy would outrage the Palestinians,
require inclusion of a large Arab population within Israel's borders,

85

and would provide embarassing proof of the Arabs* charge that Israel
is an expansionist state.

Leaving the settlements in place, but

under Palestiniam sovereignty, is not a viable alternative for Begin
either.

One could expect the P&,3.estinian government simply to taJce

whatever steps were necessary to convince Israeli settlers to move
back to Israel (these could range from administrative harassment to
outright violence, depending upon the determination of the Israeli
settlers to remain).

Outright evacuation of the settlements would

mean repudiation of Begin*s (and the Likud Party's) concept of re
establishing Biblical Israel,

The reason for Begin's stirong oppo

sition to the Palestinian self determination concept, then, is quite
obviousJ there is no way that Begin's call for restoration of Biblical
Israel can be reconciled with Palestinian self determination.
Under the Camp David arrangment, though, Begin not only avoids
all of these problems, but he opens the door for accomplishing his
long desired dream of making the Judea and Samaria regions a part of
Israel once again. It must be realized that the Camp David framework
neither limits Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank area nor
contains any specific guarantee of P&,lestinian self determination.
Prime Minister Begin has insisted that his agreement with President
Caorter to freeze further West Bank settlement activity applies only
to the ijeriod prior to completion of Egypt-Israel i>eace negotiations,
not through the establishment of the Palestinian self governing body,
as President Carter claims. Further, Begin*s statement that he
intended to press Israel's claim to the territories during the
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negotiations concerning final disposal of the two territories in
dicates his intention of gaining Israeli control over or at least
unlimited Israeli access to these territories.

Prime Minister

Begin*8 earlier peace proposals contained demands which would guarantee
the rights of Israeli citissens to settle in the regions of Judea and
Samaria.^

One can expect Begin to insist ui)on this demand during the

preliminary negotiations forming the interim Palestinian governing
body. It is doubtful that Israel would be willing to grant the
Palestinian governing body authority to limit Israeli land purchase
and settlement in the West Bank area (unless extreme pressure were
brought to bear on the Israelis*),

As long as Israelis* were permitted

to purchase West Baiik territory, the Palestinians could do little to
prevent the more affluent Israelis* from moving into the West Bank
and buying up Arab land, thus furthering the Israeli encroachment.
The Israeli absorption of much of the West Bank could be accomplished
through economic means, then, without having to worry about the com
plications caused by outright annexation.
The Camp David agreement fails to resolve the issue of Palestinian
representation at the peace talks.

Under the Camp David format,

Palestinians are permitted in the preliminary negotiations, but only
Palestinians living within the two territories can join in the talks
without prior Israeli approval. This arrangement effectively eliminates
the PLO since Israel would veto their participation, should the PLO
decide to seek representation of the Palestinians under the cvirrent

^Newsweek, l6 January 1978, p, ^0,
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arranffement.

Yet it is )a:oing to be extremely difficult to resolve

the West Bank and Gaza Strip problems without including the PLO,
The vast majority of West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs are not active
PLO members, but the majority of these Arabs appear to accept the
PLO as their sole representative in any negotiations with Israel,
Consequently, any Israeli effort to circumvent the PLO is not going
to be acceptable to West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs, even if the newly
elected Arab spokesmen are more representative of prevailing Arab
political views in these territories than the PLO is.
It is obvious from the framework agreed upon at Gamp David that
Israel wanted to resolve the West Bajik issue by negotiating with
Jordan (which President Sadat appeairs to desire as well, given his
recent falling out with the PLO),

It is generally accepted that

King Hussein of Jordan would prefer regaining some sort of control
over the West Bank, but he has balked at entering the negotiations,
because he could not gain sufficient Israeli concessions to placate
Palestinian interests.

King Hussein would have to gain nothing less

than complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza, Strip and
East Jerusalem before he could gain limited acceptance of a return to
Jordaniaoi control.

His only alternative would be to make an attempt

at gaining self determination for the I^lestinians, thus attempting to
accomodate the Palestinian interests by achieving what the PIX) would
have little chance of accomplishing. This possibility is discussed
at length in Chapter V,
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Israel's negotiating strategy should be rather clear by now.
The key element is gaining the separate peace with Egypt, thus split
ting the Arab unity and reducing the Arab militaiy threat to oanagable
porportions.

Once an agreement has been reached with Egypt, then

Syria, Jordan and the PIX) no longer represent a viable military
threat to Iszrael.

In this situation, Israel can continue uninter

rupted its current West Bank and Gaza Strip i)olicy and extend the
policy of an imposed settlement to the Golan Heights amd Jerusalem
issues. Simply put, without Egypt, the Arabs currently are not in a
very good position to gain anything more than the minimal concessions
from Israel,
Golgm Heights
It has been demonstrated previously that Israeli policy in the
Golan Heights has stopped just short of annexation, so it would not
be particularly difficult for Israel to take the integration and
consolidation actions one step farther.

In general, the Golan Heights

policy adopted by Israeli governments prior to Begin's administration
was one of near total annexation of the area, with the possibility
of minor concessions being made in the farthest reaches of the eurea.
No specific details of Prime Minister Begin's Golan Heights policy
have been made public, though Begin has indicated that the Golan
Heights territory is not the major concern to him that it was to pre
vious Israeli administrations.

It is very possible that Syria could

gain more concessions from the Begin administration than from previous
Israeli governments, though it is doubtful that Begin's concessions
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Hould even come close to the Syrian demand for total Israeli with
drawal.

With Egypt out of the picture, though, Israel is under no

real pressure to negotiate with Syria,

More than likely, little if

any progress would be nade on the Golan Heights issue, but Israel
could prolong the negotiations indefinitely, so lack of progress in
the negotiations would not be a major cause for concern,
Jerusalem Negotiations
In the Jerusalem issue considerable differences exist between
the negotiating positions of the two sides. The Israelis'' have
already annexed extensive Arab territory in the area and insist that
the city must remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. The Arabs
counter by demanding total Israeli withdrawal from the annexed Arab
territory. The only concession maide by either side up to this point
has been the Israeli efforts taken to grant a degree of autonomy to
Arab holy places in East Jerusalem,

The Israelis

argue that their

annexation is legitimate and proper becausei (l) the primary Arab
concern in the area (the right to worship at the Dome of the Rock)
is accomodated, and (2) the refusal of Arabs to enter Israel to wor
ship at Arab shrines in East Jerusalem is a clear statement of the
Arab nations* refusal to accept Israel as a Middle East state, so
continued Isiraeli control of a unified Jerusalem is necessary to insure
that Jews would not be denied access to Jewish holy places in the
East Jerusalem area.

The Jerusalem issue is so complicated, and so

many different arrangements have been offered as possible solutions,
that the discussion of the various possibilities will be included with
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the Jerusalem discussion in the followins; chapter.
Conclusions
The entire Israeli neerotiatinp stratejcy is dependent upon ^ettin/? E(?ypt out of the conflict, though there are ^j:ood reasons for
Israel's bankinp: so heavily ujjon this possibility.

It must be realized

that Eteypt is the Arab nation which would benefit the most from a
peace settlement. The Egyptian economy was on the verge of collaspe
before the 1973 War, and the situation has not improved much followinf?
the conflict.

President Sadat was extremely bitter over Saudia

Arabia's willingness to provide money to finance the Egyptian military
venture a^ianst Israel, while refusin^sr to provide E^ypt with adequate
financial investment for desperately needed industrial development.
As Sadat correctly pointed out, it was the Egyptian lives lost in the
October War which made it possible for the price of oil to quadruple,
crivin^ Saudia Arabia immense wealth,Yet, Saudia Arabia does not
want an economically healthy Ep:ypt challenging them for leadership
in the Arab world, so the Saudis limit their financial assistance to
keepint^ E^^ypt afloat and nothing more,

Sadat has mana^^ed to attract

capital from other sources, but his economy is still on the brink of
disaster.

By November of 1977 Ejarypt was so deeply in debt (over 12

billion) that outside banking interests (primarily the World Bank)
made it clear to Sadat that he would have to cut defense spending
(25 percent of GNP) and place revenue in productive areas or face cut
^^Alvin Z, Rubenstein, "Egypt Since the October War," Current
History 70 (January 1976)t 17.
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off of funds.

Also, Epypt was unable to pay the k billion it owed to

the Soviet Union for military hardware, so the Soviet Union cut off
Efljypt's supply of spare parts, leavin^^ Egypt virtually powerless even
to defend itself.

Consequently, Sadat had to seek some sort of si^ree-

ment with Israel simply as a matter of survival.
It is these economic problems of Eprypt which ^ive Prime Minister
Beffin confidence that his hard line policy can succeed.

It is obvious

that the rewaa?ds of such a policy can be s^reat for Israel,

Certainly,

Be^rin appears to have pressured Sadat to accept a separate peace,
while thwarting Palestinian demands for self determination. If Be^in
A

continues to outmaneuver the Arabs, Israel can retain control of
(or at a minimum, access to) much of the territory it values, maintain
military forces in most of the imi»rtant security areas, and retain
control of a unified Jerusalem,

It is easy to understand why Israel

would adopt this nep:otiatin^^ stratep:y, but it should be realized that
the consequences of it very possibly could be far pireater than is
immediately evident.
The major problem with Israel's stratepcy is that it places too
much reliance upon Egypt's remaininp: out of any future Middle East
conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

The chances of keeping? E^jypt

out of future conflicts are not too favorable. One of the difficulties
with the Israeli strate<?y is that it asks President Sadat to forfeit
much of the prestipje he has built up in the Arab world.

If Sgidat

makes a separate peace agreement with Israel without gaining any re
ciprocal Israeli agreement to recognize the Palestinian right of self
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determination, to accept the principle of withdrawal from Arab ter
ritory, and to acknowledge that different arrangements need to be
worked out concerninp: Jerusalem, then Sadat would be re^rarded as a
traitor by much of the Arab world.

Stripped of support within the

Arab world and greatly diminished in stature both at home and abroad,
Sadat would stand little chance of survivin^jf for very lon<?.

It must

be realized, then, that the precarious state of the Egyptian economy
is a double-ed^ed sworti.

Certainly, Israel can extract concessions

from President Sadat, f?iven his present predicament, but if it goes
too far it risks the possibility of Sadat bein^ deposed and replaced
by a hard line faction. This possibility is particularly acute, given
the economic situation in Egypt,

Sadat's efforts to shore up the

Egyptian economy early in 1977 by cutting government subsidies led to
extensive rioting in Cario, which gives a good indication of just
how tenuous President Sadat's hold on the government is.

It is ex

tremely unlikely that Sadat could remain In power for very long if
he caved in to the Israeli demands, eind it is doubtful that whoever
replaced hire would continue his moderate policies.

In times of severe

economic depression, one of the easiest means of dealing with the pro
blem is finding a scapegoat upon which a skillful government can direct
the hostility and frustration of the citizens. In this case, Israel
would be the: perfect target.
Another major problem of the Israeli policy is that it assumes
that Israel can continue its present policy without suffering any undue
domestic consequences. Since the 1973 War a number of signs have
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surfaced which indicate that Israel is sufferin^^ severe consequences
on the home front because of its policy.

In the first place the huge

demand for American arms required to continue a hard line policy has
had a drastic effect upon the Israeli balance of payments,

Israel's

current balance of payments defecit is about 10 billion dollars, and
it continues to mount because of a defense budget which consimes 32
11
percent of GNP,

This deficit has led to several currency devalu

ations and major tax increases while causing: inflation to skyrocket
1?
(estimated at 50 percent for this year).

The net effect of all this

is a drastic reduction in purchasinj^ power of the average Israeli
citizen, as well as a corresponding decline in living standards. The
nation of Israel is feeling the effects of the economic squeeze and
psychological strain caused by living under the constant threat of
war,

Jews are leaving Israel in incireasing numbers, and many potential

immigrants are choosing to live elsewhere (in 1976 almost 50 percent
13
of Soviet Jews leaving Russia chose to live elsewhere).

Between

1973 and 197^ alone, immigration to Israel decreased by 42 percent
(32,000 versus 55»000), and by 1976 emigration exceeded immigration

(20,000 to 18,600),^^ If this situation continues, coupled with pre
vailing Jewish and Arab birth rates, Arabs might well outnumber Jews
^^Guido Goldman, "Why Israel Should Settle Now," New York Review
of Books. 18 Hay 1978, p. 35.
12
IMi.
13
Elizabeth Monroe, "The West Banki Palestinian or Israeli?,"
The Middle East Journal 31 (Autumn 1977)« 400,
^^Ibid.
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within Israel proper by the tuim of the century. It is clearly evi
dent f then, that the hard line policy is extracting an inmense toll
uixjn Israel's donestic well bein^.
The final problem with Israel's current policy is that even if
Israel gains everything!: it wants, there is no reason to believe that
this solution would ftuarantee Israeli security in the Middle East,

It

has already been demonstrated what the likely consequences of Israeli
policy would be in Ep^pt, and one could expect a similar reaction
throughout the Arab world.

The complete frustration of Arab diplomatic

objectives would most likely lead to a recommitment to the Arab policy
of wiping Israel off the Middle East map* rather tham the Arab's
grudging acceptance of and gradual normalization of relations with
Israel,
The gravest consequences could result from the suppression of
Flalestinian nationalist ambitions and the encroachment ui)on Arab lands
in the West Bank,

Frustrated in gaining their objectives in the West

Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinians might turn elsewhere to establish
a base of operations, particularly Jordan and Lebanaon,

The possi

bility for Palestinian takeover of Lebanon has already been discussed
in Chapter II, and the potential for this takeover occurring would be
far greater if none of the Palestinian demands are satisfied by Israel,
Syria is virtually in control of Lebanon now, so if Syria decided to
support the PLO-Lebanese Muslim coalition against the Lebanese
Christians (which would be very likely if Israel shows no interest
in making major concessions in the Golan Heights), then Israel would
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have to enter the war on the side of the Lebanese Christians to pre
vent a PLO-Lebanese Muslim takeover of the country.
The situation is Jordan also presents a great problem for
Israel's current policy.
divided.

The basic problem is that Jordan is a house

Most of Jordan's problems are a direct result of the annex

ation of the West Bank territory following the 19^8-49 Arab-Israel War,
At the time the area provided Jordan with substantial economic benefits
from increased agricultural production and an extensive increase in
tourism.

Yet Jordan gained far more problems than benefits from its

annexation action.

One of the most serious drawbacks of the action

was that it earned Jordan the permanent enmity of many Arab nations,
because it demonstrated that Jord?in used the 19^-^9 War to its own
advantage at the expense of its Arab neighbors. While other Arab
nations involved in the war were intent upon defeating the Jews and
returning Palestine to Palestinian Arab control, Jordan was concen
trating upon grabbing as much of Palestine as possible. The second
major drawback of the annexation action was that it created severe
domestic conflicts within the country, for overnight Jordan became
a nation in which over half the population was a foreign nationality
(Palestinian), The Palestinians were, by and large, a far more educated
and sophisticated people than the provincial, nomadic Heshemites of
Jordsm, so the Palestinians quickly developed a strong resentment to
being governed under the Jordanian monarnhlal system, while the
Hashemites resented the rapid incorporation of the more educated
Palestinians into high administrative positions within the Jordanian
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government,

Jordan's problems in assimilating Palestinians became

even more acute followin^^ the Six Day War.

Over 225i000 fled to the

East Bank (Jordan proper) durin/;^ the war, and by 1973 the Palestinians
made up more than kO percent of the population of Jordan proper.
It is this massive presence of Palestinians alon^ with Jordain's
basic isolationist position in the Middle East which so complicates
the Jordanian situation. Given the lar^re numbers of Palestinians in
Jordan, the PLO can force King Hussein to adopt a fair more ag^essive
policy a^rainst Israel or risk civil war within his own country. The
former situation could involve Israel directly in a war (or at least
extensive guerrilla action), while the latter situation would require
direct Israeli intervention to preserve Hashemite control in Jordaui,
The suppression of Palestinian nationalism, then, merely replaces one
problem with another potentially lar^rer one.

In fact, it is very

possible that Israel would find itself facing, once again, enemies on
three sides who would be eager to continue the fight against Israel
(the front could expand to four sides, should a hard line group come
to power in E^pt),
The likely result of Israeli diplomatic success, then, would be
the placing of Israel under a permanent state of siege.

It is imma

terial whether or not the Arab forces could defeat Israel on the
battlefield; they could cause immense casualties for Israel certainly,
and foirce Israel to face the realization that they would have little
hope of avoiding a continuous succession of costly armed conflicts
with Arab neighbors.

Israel would gain no more security than it had
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before the 19^7 War, and the Middle East political situation would
remain as unstable as ever. It seems that the time has come for
Israel to make a genuine effort to resolve its differences with the
Arab nations.

The arrangements of such a peace settlement and the

meajis for achieving it are discussed In the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

The precedinj? chapters have ^iven some indication of the magni
tude of the task involved in resolving the Middle East conflict. The
Israeli's and the Arabs are still bitterly divided over many of the
basic issues of the conflict.

None of the parties involved have good

reason to place much trust in the words of the opposition, and in fact
can have little confidence in the strength of the commitment of their
own allies.

Finally* the Israelis have little reason to believe that

the centuries old Arab commitment to the Jihad will die a quick death,
nor can the Arabs accept any assurances that Israel is not becoming an
exi>ansionist state, intent upon swallowing up much of the West Bank and
Golan Heights,
Still, considerable progress has been made. Certainly Egypt
appears willing to accept Israel as a Middle East nation, Jordan appears
to be seeking an acceptable means of accomodation with Israel (rather
than confrontation), while even Syria auid Saudia Arabia are showing
signs of resigning themselves to a Jewish state in the Arab Middle
East,

President Sadat's suprise journey to Jerusalem in November of

1977 and Prime Minister Benin's return trup to Gario shattered the
traditional Arab Insistence upon no face to face negotiations, and
provided a clear signal that Egypt was abandoning a military solution
to the Middle East problem.

The 1978 Camp David agreement confirmed
98

99

this Ep:yptian policy, setting? the sta^e for a separate x>eace treaty
to be neffotiated between Egypt and Israel,
Sinai
The final details of the separate peace are still beinf^ worked
out, though the preliminary agreement reached at Ceubp David resolved
most of the basic issues.
follows.

The major points of the agreement are as

In the area of relations between Egypt and Israel, both

sides agree to (l) full recognition, (2) abolish economic boycotts,

(3) guarantee that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other
nation shall enjoy the protection of due process of law, (4) explore
the possibilities of joint economic development, and (5) consider the
possibility of establishing claims commissions.
The teiritorial aspects of the agreement provide for the follow
ing! (1) return of the entire Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, (2)
withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from the Sinai, (3) the use
of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafan, Ras en Njuil
and Sham el Sheihk for civilian purposes only, including possible
commercial use by all nations, (4) the right of free passage by ships
of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, with the Straits
of Tiran and Gulf of Aquaba being recognized as international wateirways for freedom of navigation and overflight by all nations, and (5)
the construction of a hiprhway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat
with guaranteed free and peaceful use by Egypt and Jordan.
The following military arrangements are agreed to in the pacts
(1) no more than one division (mechanized or Infantry) of Egyptian
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armed forces will be stationed within an area lyinp: approximately 50
kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, (2) only UN forces
and civilian police equiped with light weapons will be stationed within
an area lyini^ west of the international border and Gulf of Aquaba
varyin^i^ in width from 20 kilometers to 40 kilometers, (3) in the area
3 kilometers east of the international boundary, Israeli forces will
be limited to k infantry battalions and UN observers, (4) border pa
trol units not to exceed 3 battalions will supplement the civil police
in maintaining order in the Sinai area not mentioned above, and (5)
UN forces will be stationed in parts of the area in the Sinai lyin^^
within about 20 kilometers of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to
the international boundary, and in the Sharm el Sheihk area,^

The

precise location of the boundary lines for these particular demil
itarized zones is to be worked out at the final peace talks,
West Bank and Gaza Strip
This Camp David afl^reement also outlined a framework for an over
all Middle East peace, paying particular attention to the West Bank
issue.

In the previous chapter it was noted that this West Bank

aigreement allowed Prime Minister Begin the possibility of realizing
most of his territorial aunbitions. The agreement did not guarantee
Palestinian self determination, it did not require Israeli evacuation
of settlements, withdrawal from the territory, or even eventual Israeli
removal of all military forces. By merely providing for negotiation
^See The Washington Post. 19 September 1978, p, I6, for a text
of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt,
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of these issues, it allowed Prime Minister Be^in several avenues for
pursuing Israeli ambitions in the territory.

Under the Camp David

arrangment, Be(^in can press for continued Israeli control over the
territory through a confederation with Israel, he can seek annexation
of West Bank territory heavily settled by Israelis, or he can adopt
a strategy of granting autonomy to West Bank Arabs while maintaining
Israeli military forces in strategic locations and insuring Israeli
takeover of desired West Bank areas through a policy of open migration
of people (both Arab and Israeli) throughout all of the Palestine area.
All of these policies would allow Prime Minister Begin to continue
Israeli control over most West Bank areas in which Israel has shown
an interest.

Without the threat of Egyptian military forces, the

Palestinians and Jordan would not be in a position to force many con
cessions from the Israelis,

In short, the Camp David agreement leaves

Israel in an excellent position to accomplish its ends.
The Camp David arrangements pose potentially serious consequences
for the Arab side, since the agreement precluded other alternative
methods of resolving the conflict. In the past most efforts for re
solving the conflict concentrated upon a unified approach, one in
which all i>arties to the conflict would meet at a single location and
work out an agreement.

Although a unified approach (such as the

proposed Geneva convention arrangement) appeared to be most advanta
geous to the Arab side, Sadat's peace initiative has circumvented any
possibility for a Geneva convention,

Apiarently Sadat realized that the

unified Arab representation at a Geneva convention approach would be
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detrimental to achievinsr any peace settlement, because the moderate
Arab nations would be too restricted in their actions by the hard line
block (PLO and Syria, backed by the Soviet Union) to allow for any

2
proffress to be made.

President Sadat decided to go it alone, appar

ently, because he needed a settlement, and he knew that his chances
of ^ettin^ one would be better if he negotiated separately.
Initially, President Sadat's method circumvented the hard line
elements by asking Israel merely to commit itself to a principle of
withdrawal and the principle of Palestinian self determination, with
the details of such an arranpjement beinpj worked out by the individual
states or political entities immediately involved.

At Camp David

Sadat compromised his earlier approach and accepted the Israeli
statement that the overall peace settlement must recognize "the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements,"
rather than hold out for a straightforward Israeli statement accept
ing Palestinian self determination. Since Egypt and Israel are on the
verge of concluding a peace treaty, it appears that there will be no
Geneva conference, no unified Arab front to face Israel in Middle East
negotiations.

Whether they like it or not, the Arab nations are going

to have to conduct future negotiations with Israel within the frame
work outlined in the Camp David agreement, or risk the possibility of
Israel merely imposing the settlement it wants in the West Bank should
the Arabs refuse to go along with the Camp David framework,
2
This is essentially the argujs<»nt offered by Robert Tucker in "The
Middle Easti For a Separate Peace, " Coanientaiy, March 1978» PP» 25~31»
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It has already been noted that the framework agreed ujjon at Caap
David provide;?

ar arranfrement within which Israel can accomplish most

of its objectives. Since this framework is likely to be the arrange
ment within which any negotiations take place, it is essential to
take a closer look at it to see what it holds for possibilities of
accomplishing Arab interests, particularly Palestinian interests in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
The central issue for the Palestinians is the question of self
determination.

On this issue the Camp David aj^reement, admittedly,

is rather imprecise, for it merely affirms that the "legitimate rights
of the Palestinian people and their just requirements" must be recofi^
nized in any peace settlement. Quite obviously, this statement caun
mean different thin^^s to different people.

The previous discussions

in this thesis conceminp; the Palestinian question have indicated
that Israel certainly can use this va^ue statement as a means of
denying self determination to the Palestinians,
side to the statement.

Yet, there is another

In an interview in January of 1978, Prime

Minister Bef^in stated that he beHeved ttiat the West Bank eind Gaza
Strip were Israeli territory, that these areas belonged to the Jewish
people, but he acknowledged that there were other claims to the terri3
tory so the question of sovereignty should be left open.

Although

Begin did not mention the Palestinians by name, he, in fact, acknow
ledged the historical identity of the Palestinian people, something
which all previous Israeli governments were loath to do. This recog-

^Newsweek. 16 January 1978, p, 40,
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nition that the Palestinians do have some claim over the West BaJik and
Gaza Strip territories is the first step in accepting the riprht of
Palestinian self determination. The Camp David a^^reement takes this
pivital process several steps further. It specifically states that a
Palestinian 'Voverninf? body" will "be elected to represent Palestinians
in the final nepiotiations for resolution of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip question as well as be the "autonomous eiovemment" administering^
Plalestinian affairs in the two territories.
Taken together, these developments represent a significant step
in the direction of Palestinian self determination.

Now that Israel

has acknowledged the historical rights of the Palestinian people in
Mandated Palestine,

provided for an elected body to represent the

Palestinians, and acknowledged that the Palestinians' "legitimate
rights" and "just requirements" be recognized, it has set in motion
an irreversible process,

Israel might be able to stall off the

Palestinian demaJids for awhile, but it is almost certain that the
Israelis* intense desire for peace, coupled with the Palestinians*
unrelenting demand for independence, would lead to the inevitable
conclusion.

Indeed, most of Prime Minister Begin*s own party members

passionately opposed the Caunp David accords precisely because they
believed that it would lead to a Palestinian state,^
Certainly, to proceed through the Camp David framework is a
roundabout means for the Palestinians to accomplish their primary

^The Knesset approval of the Camp David accords irreversibly
commits Israel to this position.
The Washington Post. 28 September 1978, p, 2^,
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objective, but it mierht be the only politically feasible approach
at the moment.

If the Palestinians are to be successful in their

quest for self determination, they are froinp^ to have to persuade the
Israelis to accept this principle,
is next to impossible.

Ris:ht now, persuasion of Israel

If Prime Minister Begin had returned from

Camp David with a pact which recognized Palestinian self determination,
he would have had no chance of gaining Knesset approval of it.

With

the Palestinian issues left to recognition of legitimate rights, though.
Begin is free to offer his own interpretation of the agreement, claim
ing as he does that Israel's settlements will remain in the West Bank,
that Israeli forces will remain indefinitely in the West Bank, and that
no Palestinian state is in the offering. Serene in the belief that
Israel's policy can continue unabated, the Israeli citizen can bask
in the euphoria of the Camp David accomplishments, while putting off
the hard choices which must be made to finish the task at hand,^
Once the Israelis become convinced that peace is both achieveable and
infinitely preferable to the state of siege which preceded it, one can
expect Israel to become far more responsive to the Palestinians*
demands for statehood.

It is somewhat ironic that Israel, which

gradually came into being because the language of the Balfour Dec
laration was sufficiently vaigue to appease the Palestinian Arabs(
^I, F, Stone argues that this is precisely one of the major
advantages of the Camp David accords, that it allows the Israelis to
deceive themselves about the extent of concessions that they will have
to make, and that it forces the Israelis to get involved in a long,
drawn out process, which, in the long run, favors the Palestinian hopes
of self determination. See, I, F. Stone, "The Case for Camp David,"
The New York Review of Books. 26 October 1978, p, 11,
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miiBiht well have set the stage for Palestinian statehood by afcreeing
to the vaguely worded Camp David agreement of 1978.
Since the Arabs stand to lose more by avoiding (rather than
entering) the negotiating framework called for in the Camp David
agreements, it would be to their advantage to become involved in the
peace process.

The Camp David framework calls for much of the West

Bank negotiating burden to be borne by Jordan, so the pivotal figure
in the future of Middle East peace is going to be King Hussein of
Jordan,

King Hussein should agree to enter the negotiations, but he

should make it explicitly clear to President Caxter and the Israelis
that Jordan will refuse to enter talks if Israel makes any efforts
either to construct new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
or reinforce the settlements alreauiy in place.

Once that this message

is pointedly conveyed, Hussein can take steps to outmaneuver the PLO,
King Hussein should make it clear to Yasir Arafat of the PLO that
continued boycotting of the peace process risks losing large amounts
of West Bank territory and plays into Israel's hands (an opinion that
Hussein seems to hold).

Therefore, Arafat can stay out of the talks

and continue his hoi>eless efforts at a militaiy solution, or he can
make an effort to negotiate with Israel,

If Arafat does not want to

seek nesrotiations with Israel, then King Hussein can infonn Arafat that
Jordan will enter the talks with the single intention of gaining an
independent Palestinian state.
King Hussein can give Arafat the choice of going public with his
counter proposals or having Hussein carry them to the Israelis in

10?
private talks. Should Arafat decide to open up a diolop:ue with the
Israelis, he does not have any choice but to give up the PLO drean
of a liberated Palestine,

In order even to be considered* Arafat

would have to offer the followinia; concessionsi (l) acceptance of Israel
as a Middle East nation, (2) affireement to normalization of relations
between Israel and the P&,lestinian entity, (3) end terrorist activity,
and ('4') make a genuine effort at peaceful coexistence.

In turn Arafat

could demand complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory
of the West Bank, Caza Strip and East Jerusalem, and an Israeli guar
antee of Palestinian self determination.

The concessions for Arafat

would be tremenduous, but anything less than this would not be con
sidered a reasonable offer by Israel.

It would be to Arafat's advan

tage to go public with this set of proposals, gaining enormous public
attention and tremenduous support worldwide.

With this action Arafat

could gain an image as the moderate champion of Palestinian inde
pendence opposing expansionist Israel.
Regardless of the political possibilities of this approach, it
is unlikely that Arafat would be willing to make so many concessions
merely to enter into a negotiating process that offers no strong possibilities for Palestinian success.

(it would be extremely unlikely

that Israel would be willing to negotiate with the PLO under any
"^Arafat has conceded privately to the Saudia Arabians that he
would accept UN Resolution 2^2 (which recognizes Israel's right to exist
as a Middle East nation) if it were amended to include a statement
affirming the national rights of the Palestinian people, and if the
United States would support Palestinian self determination. See, Leon
Wieseltier, "Interview with General Peled," New York Review of Books,
23 February 1978, P. 17, for details.

108

circumstances, now, so Arsifat may not want to risk the loss of prestige
caused by offering concessions totally ignored by Israel.) Once
King Hussein has made the gesture to Arafat, he would be in a position
to make thr* move for resolving the Palestinian issue.

In order to be

successful, Hussein is going to have to do some astute political
maneuvering, for his situation is formidable. He is faced with an
Israeli government bent on gaining control of as much of the West
Bank as possible, a Palestinian populace which could be exi)ected to
regard his move with outright hostility, and very little supjyart in
the remainder of the Arab world.
King Hussein's first step would be to gain support from Saudi
Arabia.

He would have to persuade the Saudis that the major objective

of West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations would be gaining an inde
pendent Palestinian state, and that he had the best chance of accom
plishing this. The next step would be to announce publicly that he
is entering the nescotiation process in an effort to gain national rights
for the Palestinian people.

Of course, the f^lestinians would be quite

skeptical of such an announcement coming from Hussein, but it is
important that Hussein ^et this statement on the public record, so he
could gain at least a little support from the West Bank and Gaza
Strip Palestinians,

The final step would be to conduct a propagsuida

campaign in which Hussein could attempt to swing world-wide opinion
behind his effort, gain some Arab support for his policy, and alleviate
some of the Israelis* fears concerning the formation of a Palestinian
state.
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It would be to King Hussein's advantage to conclude the initial
phase of the negotiations as quickly as possible and get some kind of
Palestinian self governing body set up, which could act as a propaganda
aigent promoting the cause of Palestinian independence.

The most im

portant concession for Hussein to gain in this initial phase of
negotiations is a signed pledge freezing new settlement construction
and old settlement expansion during the transition period to auton
omous Palestinian self government.

Obviously, Prime Minister Begin

would not want to sign such an agreement, but the victory of getting
Hussein to the negotiating table, the possibility of finally resolving
the West Bank and Caza Strip issues, and the realization that he could
count upon Labor Party support to offset opposition within his own
party might make this somewhat acceptable to Begin,

King Hussein and

President SsuJat would have to bring treraenduous pressure to bear upon
Begin (particularly by gaining US support for this crucial clause),
and it is likely that they would have to make some sort of pledge
which would leave open the jwssibility of Israeli settlement fol
lowing the moritorium.

The possibility of future Israeli settlement

could be accomplished by Egypt's and Jordan's agreeing to a guarantee
of the free migration of peoples following the conclusion of a final
peace treaty. This arrangement would circumvent the Gush Emunim's
efforts to colonize the West Bank, for without Israeli government
support (military, logistical and land condemnation), these groups
would be unable to expand their numbers currently in the territory,
thus discouraging the settlers already there.
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Once a provisional Pfeilestinian government is in place, the frame
work calls for a 5 yeax transition period, with negotiations for the
final resolution of the 2 territories to take place not later than 3
years after the conclusion of the initial West Bank/Ceusa Strip
negotiations.

It is during this transition period the King Hussein

is going to have to take the initiative. The first order of business
is to gain extensive world-wide support for the Palestinian cause.
The Palestinians already can count upon complete Third World support,
and it would be quite simple to gain very strong support for the
Palestinian cause in Western European countries (particularly with
a little oil politics pressure applied).

The crucial nation from

which King Hussein must gain support is the United States, both in
the presidency and in the public at large.

It is absolutely essential

for Hussein to persuade the US President! (l) that Jordan truly
desires peace in the Middle East and fully accepts Israel as a Middle
East nation, (2) that the only means through which this can be
accomplished is the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and

(3) that Jordan will coordinate actions with Israel to insure that
this new Palestinian state poses no major threat to Israel or to the
stability of the Middle East political situation. Also, King Hussein
must conduct an extensive propaganda campaign in the United States
demonstrating that the Palestinian claim to Mandated Palestine is
certainly equal to Israel's claim (as has been shown in Chapter II),
and that the Palestinians should not be denied what is granted to
Israel,

Furthermore, King Hussein has to convince the American public

Ill
that this Palestiniaui entity will commit itself to peaceful relations
with Israel,

This objective will be quite difficult to do (since

most Palestinians do not appear to desire peaceful coexistence with
Israel and say so in no uncertain terms), but Hussein should be able
to keep the elected Palestinian f^oveming body from making provacative
statements which would sabotage hopes for independence. President
Sadat's efforts on behalf of this campaip:n would be sin important
factor on Hussein's side, since Sadat has gained considerable credi
bility in the eyes of the American public in the lajst year.
Of equal importance to King Hussein is gaining strong Saudi
Arabiain support for this course of action.

King Hussein will have to

convince the Saudis that his efforts hold the best chance of alleviating
the Palestinian problem which so unstabilizes the Middle East (and
which so concerns the Saudi Arabians with their large Palestinian
work force), If Hussein can get momentum going in his campaign for
Palestinian independence, he is in a position to gain some Palestinian
support and demonstrate the potential of his policy to the Saudis,
With Saudi support, Hussein is in a strong position to exert con
siderable leverage within the United States,

The Saudis can tie

American support of Palestinian self determination to oil politics,
and simply tell the US President that he is going to have to exert
considerable political pressure on the Israelis to accept Palestinian
self determination or risk having the SandIs rejoin the side of OPEC
nations pushing for much higher oil price hikes than the Saudis have
advocated previously.

11?
The third objective that King Hussein has to accomplish is to
keep things under control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

He has

to demonsti^te that the Palestinian "governing body" is a legitimate
authority. Since the Camp David framework allows for Jordanian
"citizens" to participate in the Palestinian security forces and
calls for joint Jordanian-Israeli patroDs, Hussein is in a strong
position to exert force if necessary to maintain order in the areas
administered by the Palestinian self governing authority.
During the 5 year transition period several steps could be taken
in the area of military withdrawals by Israel which would ease tensions
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas.

King Hussein should agree

readily to the continuous presence of Israeli forces in areas of
primary security concern to Israel, namely in the security belt
region along the Jordan River and along Israel's narrow corridor
region.

However, Hussein should insist that the remaining areas of

the West Bank be protected by Jordanlan-Iklestinian security forces.
It would be advisable for Hussein to seek a compromise on this issue
and allow implementation of Palestinian-Jordanian security arrange
ments to be a gradual process which could be drawn out over the
entire 5 year transition period, if necessary.

This withdrawal of

Israeli troops could be accomplished through a joint Israeli-Jordanian
task force which would coordinate the transfer of Israeli military
control to Jordanian control. The process could begin at the Jericho
corridor between the West Bank and Jordan proper and spresui gradually
(within 1 year) into the areas of high Arab population and no Israeli
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settlements.
The next, and most important, step for Kinf? Hussein would be to
^aln transfer to Jordanian-Palestinijin security forces control over
some areas containing Israeli settlements.

King Hussein could argue

that if Israelis and Palestinians are going to get along peacefully,
as Israel has advocated for so many years, it is important for the
Arabs to demonstrate their ability to uphold the rights of Jews under
Arab administrative authority.

This would be a strong argument sup

porting Hussein's position, since an Israeli refusal to accept the
proposal would provide strong evidence that Israel's primary concern
is gaining control of West Bauik territory rather than seeking means
through which Israeli citizens cjin be allowed to live in West Bank
areas of religious and historical significance to Jews.

If King Hussein

wins this point (and his chances would be quite good), then it would
be best to limit transfer of settlement security to a few isolated
settlements, with the ones around Ramallah and along the Dead Sea
being the most likely candidates.

Since most Israeli settlers have

shown little penchent for relating to their Arab neighbors, it is
expected that this transfer of security responsibility would convince
many of the settlers to abandon the effort and go back to Israel proper.
In the Gaza Strip the arrangements would be quite similar, with
the Jordanian-Palestinian security forces taking over most of the
territory. The Israeli military forces could be restricted to the
four paramilitary settlements in the territory, and a brigade-size
force stationed along the Oaza Strip-Egypt boundary to provide security
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along this crucial area. This Jordanian assumption of security
measures for much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip area should not
create many problems,

Jordan certainly has ample reasons of its own

to prevent terrorist activity from taking place, and the aggressive
suppression of any terrorist activity in its zone of control would
improve relations between Jordan and the one Middle East nation
(Israel) that has a strong interest in seeing that Hashemite control
of Jordan continues.

The only other problem in security activity is

riot control, and the gradual withdrawal of the Israelis would tend
to negate the cause for riots in the first place.
The conclusion of preliminary security negotiations would set
the stage for the final phase of West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations.
By this time if King Hussein has managed to halt any Israeli expansion
into West Bank territory, and even turn it around slightly with the
assumption of Ralestinian-Jordanian security for some Israeli settle
ments, he may well have ended any Israeli hopes for the gradual
absorption of the West Bank territory.

Failure to accomplish this

absorption would deal a severe blow to the exi)ansionist elements in
Israel, and would most likely result in a swing towards accomodation
and peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians as the prevaling politi
cal climate within Israel,

This development, coupled with a swing of

world-wide public opinion behind the Palestinian cause, would give the
Arab side the momentum going into the negotiations.

In this situation

Israel virtually would be forced to modify its strategy from one of
denying Palestinian self determination to one of determining just what
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conditions it will allow Palestinian nationalism to develop under
and ultimately exist in.

If» however, Kin^ Hussein and the Pales

tinians enter negotiations in a weaJtened condition (due to an extreme
split amon(:c Palestinians, lack of firm Saudi Arabian or American
support, or Hussein's failure to curtail Prime Minister Begin*s ex
pansionist activities), then Hussein would serve everyone's interests
if he simply backed out of the entire negotiating process, leaving
the Palestinians to work things out with Israel, The likely result
of this situation would be one of the scenarios outlined at the con
clusion of Chapter IV,

The best the Palestinians could hope for

would be to restrict the Israeli exi»,nsion as much as possible until
the Palestinian demand for a state of their own would be accepted by
Israel,
In a situation in which Israel had to negotiate a i)eace settle
ment rather than simply impose one, both the Israelis and the Pales
tinians would be forced to abandon some long held positions,

Israel

would have to accept the inevitability of a Palestinian state, and
the Palestinians (and Hussein) would have to accept the fact that not
all of the occ'ipisd territory would be retvimed.

Once the opposing

sides adopted a realistic outlook, serious negotiations could begin.
The primary issue to be resolved is the question of territory.
Once a Palestinian state becomes a foregone conclusion of the Israeli
government (the best that Israel could hope for would be Palestinian
acceptance of independence to be granted at some point in time fol
lowing the conclusion of the 5 year transition period, rather than
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immediate independence), then Israel will have to decide (l) what
areas it can afford to withdraw from without any problems, (2) which
areas they might be able to withdraw from over an extended period of
time, and (3) which areas must be annexed.
In the first cate^^ory Israel could immediately include all of
the West Bank areas under Jordanian control, as well as most of the
Gaza Strip, Category two would include most of the remainder of the
West Bank religious settlements, with the exception of the Kfir Etzonia
cluster and some along the border of Israel proper in the narrow
corridor region.

Other areas placed in category two include the thin

strip of territory running the width of the Gaza Strip-Egypt border,
the security corridor region bordering the Dead Sea, and the in
dustrial developments and settlements lying just outside the border
of unified Jerusalem,

Somewhere between categories two and three

would be the security belt region along the Jordan River, the Kfir
Etzonia religious settlement cluster, and the Tul Karm and Qalqilya
regions along Israel's narrow corridor,

Latrun would be the only

area irreversibly committed to category three.
The West Bank negotiations present some of the greatest polit
ical difficulties for Israel, because it requires balancing its
security needs and Gush Emunim*s expansionist demands with the need
for accomodating Palestinian interests.
problems are less acute.

In the Gaza Strip the Israeli

The Israeli government has fewer security

concerns and historical interests to accomodate, so withdrawal can be
made without creating major political difficulties.

Initially, Israel
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should put forth its maximum demands and work back from that point,
A rou^^h estimate of this offer would be as follows»

annexation of

Latrun, a slight extension (2 or 3 miles) beyond the eastern boundary
of unified Jerusalem, annexation of the Kfir Etzonia settlement region,

8

to include the newly proposed town of Ephrat,

annexation of a strip

of territory several miles wide running the length of Israel's narrow
corridor region, and amnexation of the entire security belt region
along the JoTdan River as well as the security belt along the Gaza
Strip-Egypt border,

Israel would agree to withdraw from the remainder

of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, with the religious settle
ments being left in place if the settlers desired to remain.
Of course this offer would be completely unacceptable to the
ftilestinians, but it would give Israel plenty of room to make con
cessions,

One would expect the Palestinians to counter with a demand

for total Israeli withdrawal from both territories, and to continue
making this demand until it became obvious that the Israelis would
compromise no longer on territorial matters.

At this point the

Palestinians would have to switch their emphasis to the issue of
self determination, making it abundantly clear to Israel that if it
wanted any territorial compromises from the Palestinians, then Israel
would have to compromise on the issue of Palestinian independence.
In this arrangement, the Palestinians would be in a good position to
gain independence immediately following the 5 year tramsition period
Q
A discussion about this proposed new town is contained in
the Economist. 2? May 197B, p, 64,
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or within a few years theregrfter, and they could exert leverage to
prevent unwanted restrictions ujion their independence (such as re
strictions on the sheer numbers of Palestinians allowed to return or
exclusion of former PLO members from living in the territory).
Once both sides indicated that they would be willing to make
some compromises, then Israel could be«»in transferring some of the
areas slated for annexation into areas slated for withdrawal over an
extended period.

The first areas placed into the withdrawal cate

gory could be the Gaza Strip security belt, ]x>rtions of the Jordan
River security belt, the area immediately adjacent to unified Jerusalem
and some of the territory along Israel's narrow corridor region. With
drawal could be completed from the area immediately adjacent to unified
Jerusalem within a few years (since this is not a strategic area), suid
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip security belt region could be imple
mented over a 5 year period, assuming that relations between Israel
and Egypt remained friendly.

In the security belt region along the

Jordan River, Israel should adopt a policy of maintaining a presence
only in the bare minimum needed for security considerations,

Isirael

could withdraw from all the civilian settlements along the Jordan
River, returning this land back to the Arab farmers who lived there
prior to the Israeli encroachment.
This withdrawal along the Jordan Biver could be accomplished
within a 3 year period, which would give Israel plenty of time to firm
up its fortifications and improve its transportation network in the
mountains above the valley floor.

Withdrawing Israeli forces to the
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high ground would insure minimal displacement of Arabs and leave
Israel in an excellent position to block off any invasion from the west
and to cut off supply lines between Jordan and Palestine in the event
of major fipchtins^ between Israel and Palestine Arabs,

Israel could

demand annexation of the remaining security belt area» or could seek
a long term (15 to 20 years) occupation arrangement, with the pos
sibility of withdrawal being reconsidered at the conclusion of the
term.

The latter alternative might be preferable, since it would

give Palestiniajis the hope of gaining control over this axes, event
ually.

If Israel were able to establish coirdial relations with Jordan

and Palestine in the meantime, Israel would gain more in good will by
withdrawing from the area than it would retain in security by staying.
Once Israel granted the concenssions mentioned above, two areas
of the West Bank would be slated for annexation. The latrun annexation
is an obvious cosmetic adjxistment to the border and a necessary se
curity arrangement for Israel,

It would be pointless to attempt any

other kind of arrangment here.

The second area of annexation is a

somewhat different story,

Kfir Etzonia possesses little, if any,

security value, but the area is of considerable historical significance.
The Israeli government is going to have to make some concession to
Gush Emunim and conservative expansionist interests in Israel, and
the Kfir Etzonia area appears to be the primary candidate.

It was

the first West Bank area settled, it represents an attempt to revive
a settlement that became a monument to Jewish courage during the War
of Independence, and it is sui area close enough to Israel proper that
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annexation can take place without inclusion of larpie chunks of West
Bank territory (and lax^e numbers of West Bank Arabs) within Israel.
This arranfcement would allow Israel to retain the four settlements in
the area, as well as the proposed town of Ephrat,

The aJinexation

could be accomplished by includinf^ a small semi-circle of West Bamk
territory, be^^inin^ just south of Beit Jala, extending: just outside
Kfir Etzonia, and returning: to Israel proper.
With the territorial questions out of the way, Israel could con
centrate upon security arranprements.

Much of Israel's West Bank

security would be provided by the military fortifications alonp; the
Jordan River security belt region, for the rest of its security Israel
would have to depend upon demilitarization of the West Baoik and Gaza
Strip,

This arran^rement would not be very appealing to the Israelis

(or the Palestinians either), who believe, quite ri^rhtly, that Israel
could place no trust in the Palestinians to comply with the agreement.
Still, the demilitarization could do an effective job of renderinpc the
Palestinians an ineffectual military force.

If the provisions of the

arrangement limited Palestinians to a national police (but no military
forces) restricted to sidearns and li^ht rifles (the Russian AK 47 they
now use), the Palestinians could not pose any serious military threat
to Israel,

They would be denied any railitaory aircraft, motorized

armored vehicles, artillery, rockets, heavy weapons (machine (sruns and
anti-tank weapons), mines and p^renades of any kind.

The Palestinians

would have a very difficult time of importing tanks, planes or artil
lery in any numbers before the Israelis became aware of it.

The prob
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lem that Israel would face would be the build up of lip:ht automatic
rifles and the importation of anti-tank weapons.

In any event, if

the build up reached threateninp: porportions, Israel could move into
the area and clean out the problem, since the Palestinians would not
have the firepower to stop them.
One of Israel's recurrlner fears concernini? axi independent
Palestinian state is that it will be taken over immediately by the
PLO,

This is a le^ritlmate concern, since one would expect that the

newly independent Palestinian state would select either PLO leaders
or individuals acting as PLO spokesmen as the new ^rovernraent,

Israel

should Eidopt the view that the PLO is pjoln^ to take over re^reundless,
and take necessary measures to keep the situation under control once
this happens.

Rather than attempt to keep the PLO out of the new

Palestinian state, during negotiations Israel should make it clear to
the Palestinian nes'otiators (and to the PIX) secretly) that Israel will
allow PLO members to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the
PLO is ^?oinfic to have to stop its terrorist activitj'' sind make a genuine
effort at peaceful relations between Israel and Palestine (or whatever
the Palestinians wish to call their new nation) or risk a renewal of
Israeli occupation.

Undoubtedly, the situation will be tense for some

time, but if the two nations could maintain an uneasy peace for a short
time (perhaps a year), the economic forces tieing the two nations to
gether gradually would dispell much of the hostility and suspicion
which exists between Palestinians and Israelis,
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Syria
One of the most important effects of Israel's policy of negotiat
ing: the individual territories separately is to isolate Syria,

Once

that Ejrypt is out of the picture and Palestinian ne^rotiations are
movinpr

alone;, Syria's ability to exert pressure upon Israel "becomes

very limited indeed.

With Syria in an isolated position, Israel could

conduct the Golan Heip:hts negotiations at whatever pace it wished.
The central factor determining!: the pace of nepjotiations would be the
attitude of Syria's President Assad,

As lonp; as Assad maintained his

bellip:erent attitude towjird Israel, the negotiations could be stalled
indefinitely.

If, on the other hand, Assad indicated that he no

lonfcer wanted to commit Syria to einother war against Israel, the Israeli
government could offer far more concessions in nepiotiations.
Initially, Israel should seek a very limited withdrawal from the
farthest reaches of occupied territory in the Golan Heifchts,

This

approach would allow Israel time (roughly 1 year) to complete the
Sinai arransrements as well as most of the administrative arrangements
for the 5 year interim period in the Gaza Strip and West Bemk, thus
enablinpr Israel to determine what effect these developnents would have
upon Assad,

If Assad indicated that he was opposed to the direction

ne^rotiations were takin/? and attempted to disrupt the process, then
Israel could adopt a policy of beniprn neglect towgoti the Golem Heights
issue.

Should Assad indicate that he was resip:ned to ne^rotiating de

velopments, then Israel could make a serious effort to resolve the
dispute with Syria.
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It is very likely that Assad would see that he had little choice
but to ^o along with the course of negotiations, since it would be
quite clear that he would sain nothinfc by opposing them.

Once ne

gotiations begin in earnest, Israel will have to confront the great
difficulties that the Golan Heights situation presents.

In this area

Israel cannot insure effective security precautions without terri
torial annexation, and any territorial annexation would eliminate any
possibility for a gradual Syrian toleration of the Israeli presence In
the Middle East,

Perhaps the only negotiating policy that Israel can

adopt in this territory is one of "a little bit of territory for a
little bit of peace,"

Under this policy the question of total Israeli

withdrawal would remain open during the course of negotiations; Israel
would simply agree not to annex ajiy territory as long as negotiations
continued.

The determining factor in the continuation of the ne

gotiating process would be the response of Syria to prelimingiry with
drawal arrangements. As long as Syria made a conscious effort to
comply with the demilitarization provisions of the preliminary agree
ments, curtailed all shelling of Israeli positions, ajid stopped all
terrorist attacks originating from Syrian territory, then the nego
tiating process could move on to the next phase.

If Syria failed to

uphold its end of the agreement, Israel could break off negotiations
and wait for Syria to change its attitude.
In this arrangement the areas of the Golan Heights of particular
interest to Israel or of heavy settlement concentrations become sig
nificant not as areas of potential annexation but as points of with
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drawal,

Thust Israel would face minimal disruption of settlements

durin^c an initial withdrawal of several miles, though it would require
privinp: up the superb defensive area north of Quneitra.

Since the ma

jority of settlements and one of the most important strategic loca
tions in the territory (the first line of hills above the Huleh Valley)
lie quite close to Israel proper, Israel could continue this policy of
limited withirawal over an extended period (say 10 years) before ser
ious compromises would have to be made.

These withdrawals could be

done in 2 to 3 mile wide strips running the length (north and south)
of the Golan Heights,

As long as Syria complied with the requirements

of the agreement, the process could continue, with the gradual return
of Syrian residents to the area. It would be a good idea to maintain
a slender (2 or 3 mile wide) buffer zone of UN forces between the
Israeli lines and the areas occupied by Syrian civilians.(no Syrian
military forces would be allowed to return to areas withdrawn from).
In approximately 10 years Isi^el would be reaching the critical point
beyond which withdrawal would require relenquishing all of the high
ground in the area and abandoning the settlement cluster in the south
western comer of the territory. The amount of time that it would take
to accomplish the withdrawal up to this point would give Syria ample
time to indicate the kind of future relationship it expected to have
with Israel and also give Israel an opportunity to assess the chances
for peaceful coexistence with Syria,

If Syria had been faithful in

living up to the requirements of the previous agreements, then Israel
would be in a position to make a final withdrawal from the Golan Heights,
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The advantage of this arrangement is that it frives time for
Israel's obsessive concern with security to dissipate somewhat before
p:reat demands are made upon the country.

Also, it allows President

Assad the possibility of reo:alnin^!: all of the occupied territory,
which would remove most of the incentive for any further military
action against Israel,

The extended withdrawal period allows Israel

to assess the existing Middle East political situation before enter
ing any further Golan Heights withdrawal negotiations. Finally, it
leaves Israel in a position to impose a settlement if Syria shows little
inclination to opt for peaceful relations with Israel,

Jeirusalem
The Jerusalem issue is by far the most difficult issue to resolve.
Virtually every Israeli leader of any consequence has made it unequivically clear that Jerusalem is the "heart and soul" of Israel,

Teddy

Kolleck, Mayor of Jerusalem, stated the Israeli position most accu
rately when he commented that for all the other occupied territories,
there are Israelis willing to give them up, but it would be very dif9
ficult to find an Israeli willing to give up Jerusalem,

To retain

Jerusalem, though, creates enormous problems between Israel and the
Arabs,

The most difficult problem is that Jerusalem is a holy city

for the Arabs as well, with their third most important shrine, the
Temple Mount (Dome of the Rock) located within the old walled city.
The second problem is that annexation requires inclusion of laorge
^Teddy Kolleck, "Jerusalem," Foreign Affairs 55 (July i977)« 703*
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numbers of Arabs living in Jerusalem, Hho have no desire to come under
Israeli sovereignty. Since continuation of Israeli control over
Jerusalem directly affects thousands of Arabs and indirectly affects
the entire Arab Middle East, the difficulties of resolvin^^ the issue
become apparent.
One of the stron^rest arguments that Israel has made for Israeli
control over a unified Jerusalem is the fact that they have demon
strated a commitment to insuring the freedom of access for all religions
to their particular holy places.

When one contrasts this situation with

the pre-1967 War conditions of a divided city separated by barbed wire,
with the Jews denied access to the Wailing Wall and the Airab residents
of Israel denied access to the Dome of the Rock, then it is easy to
understand the Israelis' objections to retuminjer the city to a situation
of divided sovereignty.

It would be impossible to gain Israeli accept

ance of any redivision of Jerusalem, and it would be equally imjwssible
to gain Arab acceptance of full Israeli sovereignty over the area.
Since Israel is in the position of control in Jerusalem (and is un
likely to relenquish that position short of going to war), it appears
that the best approach would be one of granting Israel's primary
demand for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control, but one in which
Israeli control over Arabs in the city would be limited and Arab holy
places would be placed under autonomous Arab control.
The first problem to resolve would be one of determining which
parties would be represented at Jerusalem negotiations.

It would be

best to limit the number of Arab participants to a Jordamian represent
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ative, an Efryptian representative, a small group representing East
Jerusalem Arabs, and an Israeli representative.

It would be advisable

to brin^ in a Saudi Arabian representative if the Saudis could be
persuaded to enter face to face negotiations with Israel,

If the

Saudis declined this offer, then they should have a representative
who would act as a consultant member of the Arab delegation.

This

arrangement would provide adequate representation for Arab interests
in Jerusalem, but would keep the hard line Arab faction out of the
negotiating process.
The negotiations would deal with four basic issuest

sovereignty,

territory, administration and the holy places. Since the basic assumj)tion underlying the peace process is the Jerusalem will remain a
unified city, the most logical approach appears to be one which asks
Israel to compromise in the areas of municipal administration and
territory, while the Arabs are asked to compromise on the issue of
sovereignty.

One glance at a map of unified Jerusalem (see map on

page 128) indicates that the area is far greater than is necessary to
insure a unified Jerusalem,

In fact the area Israel incorporated runs

almost to Ramallah in the north and Bethlehem in the south. The best
approach would be to redraw the city's boundaries roughly along the
following lines,

In the north the line could be drawn inunediateDy

south of Ramat Eshkol and French Hill areas to the Israeli imposed
eastern boundary.

The eastern boundary could be kept Intact (or

moved slightly westward if it proves to be a particular bone of con
tention to the Arabs) to a point just north of Silwan, then moved
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directly across to Israel proper.

This boundary would include most

of the built up area which makes up the contiguous city, and it would
include virtually all of the holy places of any consequence.

The

boundary would preserve the unified city and the holy places within
a singrle entity, while requirincc Israel to p:ive up all of its new
developments in the area, except for the restoration done in the
Jewish Quarter of the Old City,
The administrative arran/c^ements for p:oveming Jerusalem would
have to be somewhat complicated,

A 1976 plan offered by Israel's

Liberal Party proposed a form of dual sovereignty, with the separate
Jewish and Arab areas being divided into relatively autonomous town
ships under a federated municipal government which had specifically
designated powers over the individual township,This plan appears
to be the most fruitful approach, though it appeaurs that the fed
erated arrangement could be limited to Arab townships, while keeping
the Jewish areas under a unified administi^tion.

Under this arrange

ment unified municipal services could be continued, but the Arabs
would retain considerable autonomy in managing their own affairs, with
the authority of Jerusalem's municipal government being limited to
strictly defined areas.

In short, the Arab townships would retain all

powers of government not specifically denied them by the municipal city
charter.

In fact it would be advisable to go so far as to restrict the

use of tax revenues collected in Arab townships to the area itself,

^®See Michael Brecher, "Jerusalemi

Israel's Political Decisions,

19^7"*1977»" The Middle East Journal 32 (Winter 1978)' 30» for an out
line of this plan.
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and to offer dual Palestinian-Israe]i citizenship to the Arab residents
of Jerusalem,
The problem of the holy places would not be too difficult to
resolve, since Israel's current arranp'ements leave Muslims and
Christians in virtual autonomous control of their particular holy
places.

This arran^rement could be continued, though modified some

what according to the desires of the Christian and Arab bodies now
administering the sites, and formalized by treaty.

Determining the

final arrangements for the Christian holy places should create little
problem, but resolution of the Arab holy sites will require more com
plicated arrangements simply because the Arab nations that would not
open diplomatic relations with Israel following a peace agreement (this
would include many of them) would refuse to allow their citizens to
enter Israel,

This problem could be side-stepped by forming a joint

Israeli-Jerusalem Arab customs station at Jerusalem's western border
which could separate visitors into two groups, those desiring to enter
Israel, who would have to pass throutrh Israeli customs, and those who
desired only to visit the Dome of the Rock shrine, who would be issued
a temporary visa good for the Haram Sharif area only (this contains
virtually all of the Arab holy places in Jerusalem),

The latter cus

toms arrangement could be administered by Jerusalem Arabs under the
direction of the Muslim group tasked with administering the Dome of
the Rock shrine.

This arrangement would allow Arab visitors to wor

ship at this sacred area without ever paRsin/r through Israeli customs,
which is the reason for many Arabs now being unable to visit this
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holy place.
Conclusion
With the details of the settlement proposal out of the wayi two
questions still remain to be answered:
parties involved? and Will it work?

Will it be acceptable to the

The first question has been dis

cussed at some len;?th in this chapter.

It has been demonstrated that

most of the primary objectives of the parties involved would be realized,
Effypt would retrain the entire Sinai, Syria can retrain the entire Golgm
Heijrhts if it adopts a policy of peaceful coexistence, at last
the Palestinians' demand for self determination is realized, and Israel'
is placed in a position to move from "secure" borders to accomodation
of Arab interests to srain acceptance as a Middle East nation. The
real problem of acceptance of this Middle East peace plan lies with
Israel,

Israel is asked to accept concessions that always have been

unthinkable, includinpr removal of settlements, withdrawal of military
forces from strate^cic areas, acceptance of an independent Palestinian
state, and finally acceptance of the Palestine Liberation Orp-anization,
The key to sraininf? any Israeli acceptance of these concessions is
momentum in the ne^-otiatin^ process.

If the i)ace of nepfotiations is

such that the Israeli general public can bep:in to realize that genuine
peace is a jxjssibility, that Israel can be accepted by Arab nations
(most noticably E^rypt and Jordan), then the possibility for ^ainin^
Israeli acceptance of these concessions is much greater.

One factor

aidinp: this acceptance process is that many of these difficult
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concessions are put off for an extended period, piiving time for a
"climate of peace" to develop.
the ne^otiatin/r process.

This climate of peace is critical to

Once that the possibility of peace is re

alized and the hope for its accomplishment is accelerated, then the
Israeli p:ovemraent can have much greater success in painins: public
acceptance of concessions made to the Arab nations.
The final question to be answered is?

Will it work?

In order to

understand properly the likely results of the arrangjeraent outlined
here, it should be understood that the purpose of this peace settle
ment is not to bring stability to the Middle East but to provide for
a realiprnnent of relationships amonp' Middle East nations.

The basic

divisions amon^^r the Arab states are so sireat that it is pointless to
expect lonp; term stability to develop in the Middle East,

What this

peace settlement does, then, is provide a framework within which more
practical national alignments can take place.

The presence of Israel

created an artificial unity among Arab states which tended to obscure
the basic political and historical division among Arab nations.
Certainly it is in the interest of Jordan and Egypt to preserve Israel's
strong military presence in the Middle East, for Israel can provide
economic benefit for Egypt and be in a position to lend military
assistance to Jordan,

It is to Saudi Arabia's advantage that the

most powerful Middle East nation (militarily) is a non Arab state,
heavily dependent upon outside source for oil and highly developed
economically, which makes it an excellent area for investment of Saudi
money and a possible source of military assistance in an emergency.

13^

Even Syria's primary concern lies in enhancing* its Middle East position
througfh continuation of its stabilizing role in Lebanon and in con
centrating: its defense measures against its primary enemy, Iraq.
The acceptance of Israel in the Middle East, then, allows other
Arab nations to concentrate upon their own primary concernsi

the

domestic Economy in E;»ypt, the problem of the Palestinian minority in
Jordan, Saudi Arabia's very real security concerns posed by radical
Arab states and Iran, and Syria's concern over maintaining its position
as a leader in the Arab world.

The Pfeilestinians, of course, do have

something to gain from the destruction of Israel, but the effort ex
pended in achieving such an objective would, at the very least, disrupt
efforts for desperately needed economic development, and, very likely,
would lead to a renewal of subjugation under Israel. The IsraeliPalestinian balance of strength is so overwhelmingly in Israel's favor
that, should Palestine continue a policy of provocation, Israel could
overrun the newly formed nation any time it chose to.

It is very

likely, then, that the signing of a final Middle East peace settlement
would lead to the gradual acceptance of Israel, not because the hard
line Arab states would slowly change their policy, but because the
diminishment of the Israel issue would allow other historical, political,
and economic rivalries to resurface in the Middle East, forcing these
nations to concentrate their efforts upon more pressing issues.
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